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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines inspector discretion and industry compliance in the street-
level implementation of building codes.  In particular, this study examines the effects that 
agency-level, individual-level, and environmental variables have on the choice of 
inspectors to exercise discretion.  Unique to this study is the examination of policy 
congruence between building departments and street-level inspectors as a predictor of 
industry compliance with regulatory policy.  In addition, the various effects of building 
department enforcement philosophies, departmental capacity for enforced compliance, 
and environmental variables are considered.  The findings indicate that regulatory policy 
implementation and impact are complex phenomena.  There is no single, best predictor 
for determining what influences inspector behavior and industry compliance.  Rather, this 
study shows that it is a multiplicity of factors, in concert, that shape regulatory outputs 
and outcomes.  From this dissertation we can learn lessons that can be applied to other 
policy areas to create a better understanding of inspector discretion, improve industry 
compliance with regulations, and achieve more effective street-level implementation and 
understanding of policy impact.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Regulation in America has a long and storied history.  However, regulation as 
we know it today has only existed for a few decades.  Current regulation has seen an 
explosion in activity toward both public and private entities.  Given the most recent 
developments in regulation, there has been little time to develop concrete knowledge 
about the ways that regulatory agencies behave.  According to Kagan (1994) the only 
consistent findings suggest that agencies vary in size and the manner in which they 
apply regulations. The inability to develop systematic theory has led scholars to 
engage in case studies of individual agencies, often over short periods of time.  Case 
analysis has significantly hindered progress in the understanding of how regulators 
exercise discretion, utilize different administrative styles and, more importantly, 
ascertain factors contributing to industry compliance with government regulations.   
Most of the emphasis in existing research is on a principal-agent model that 
emphasizes the role of political principals (e.g., the president, Congress) in department 
or agency behavior at the national level.  The alternative theoretical formulation is a 
bottom up model of agency discretion.  Although these actors may formulate and 
adopt policies, how they are implemented and what impacts they have may largely be 
determined elsewhere, by lower level officials.  It is the later stages of policy-making 
that are the focus of this research. 
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The Policy Process 
 
 The policy process is a complex phenomenon, one often related to systems theory 
(Easton 1965).  Over time analysts have tried to simplify it using various models.  For 
example, Kingdon (1984) conceives of policy-making as a cyclical process.  
According to Ripley (1985, 31), simplification such as this helps, “to render what is 
incredibly complex and idiosyncratic in any individual case into a set of relationships 
that are both simpler and more recurrent.”   It is important that we try to develop 
parsimonious models of the policy process for purposes of general understanding and 
theory development.  Like Ripley (1985) and Shull (1999), this study views policy-
making as a process that involves interaction among a variety of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors.   
This study specifically examines two interrelated aspects of the policy-making 
process, implementation and impact.  When considering policy-making as a process or 
cycle, implementation and impact are consecutive stages in the policy cycle model that 
posits a logical sequence of activities affecting the development of public policies.  
The two stages of the policy process that are examined in this study follow 
policy adoption, with implementation preceding impact, but with feedback from the 
various stages completing the non-recursive model.   
Implementation and impact are related; program implementation subsequently 
leads to program performance and thus impact.  By examining implementation and 
impact (or outcomes) in the same analysis, this study can begin to solve one of the 
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major shortcomings of the public policy literature: examining each phase of the policy 
process separately.  According to Meier (1994) most political scientists stop their 
studies with the adoption of public policies; implementation studies are deemed to be 
part of public administration, and policy outcomes to be in the realm of economics or 
specialists in program evaluation.  This study helps rectify this situation by examining 
policy implementation and impact in the same analysis.   
When examining policy implementation, this study focuses upon the specific 
actions that regulatory inspectors exhibit in their jobs, including such actions as 
interpreting legislation (e.g., exercising discretion) and delivering services (e.g., 
providing benefits, services, and/or coercion).  Implementation assumes that a policy 
has been stated and a program created.  Implementation refers to how officials carry 
out the adopted program.  When discussing policy impact, this study considers the 
success the regulatory program has achieved in obtaining compliance from the 
regulated industry.  Impact can be conceptualized as results or consequences of a 
program.  Moreover, impact can be thought of as reflecting both short and long-term 
results.  I now discuss these two stages in greater detail.   
Implementation.  The study of policy implementation (especially 
implementation of regulatory policy) has certainly attracted significant scholarly 
attention within political science (Bardach 1977; Edwards 1980; Goggin 1990; Hedge 
, 1989; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Nakamura and Smallwood 1980; Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984; Ripley and Franklin 1986).  Of particular interest in implementation 
studies are those actors who have traditionally been thought of as the “official” 
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implementers of policy (Caputo and Cole 1979; Maranto 1993; Nathan 1983; 
Waterman 1989). Research also has provided insights about particular policies and 
their implementation, such as Church and Nakamura’s (1993) study of implementation 
strategies in Superfund; Bryner’s (1995) study of the Clean Air Act of 1990 and its 
implementation; and Harris and Milikis’s (1984) study of regulatory change at the 
EPA and FTC.  However, we are still left with only a narrow understanding of 
implementation at the local level.  This is because many studies of implementation 
focus on federal programs but much actual policy implementation is state and local.  
When examining implementation, scholars are usually referring to the stage of 
the policy process immediately after passage of a law.  Implementation, viewed most 
broadly, means administration of the law in which various actors, organizations, 
procedures, and techniques work together to put adopted policies into effect in an 
effort to attain policy or program goals (Lester and Stewart, 2000).  Previous 
definitions of implementation have ranged from this broad conceptualization to more 
the more limited or dichotomous view that implementation is either achieved or not 
achieved.  In addition to these two definitions, implementation can be thought of as a 
process, an output, and an outcome.  For example, implementation can be 
conceptualized as a process, or a series of decisions and actions directed toward 
putting a prior authoritative legislative decision into effect.  Implementation also can 
be defined in terms of outputs, outputs being the extent to which programmatic goals 
are supported, such as the level of expenditures committed to a program or the number 
of violations issued for failure to comply with the implementation directive.  Finally, 
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at the highest level of abstraction, implementation of outcomes implies that there has 
been some measurable change in the larger problem that was addressed by the 
program, public law, or judicial decision.   
In summary, implementation as a concept involves all of these activities.  
Although it is a complex phenomenon, it may be understood as a process, an output, 
and an outcome.   
Impact.  Implementation occurs ostensibly to reach the goals of some policy or 
statute.  To analyze public policy enforcement without some attempt to address 
whether or not the policy has been successful would be an incomplete analysis.  As 
mentioned earlier, the study of policy impact also involves the analysis of 
implementation.  According to Ripley (1985) political scientists are particularly well 
equipped to handle formative evaluations of public programs.  However, and as noted 
earlier, most political scientists stop at the adoption stage of the policy process.  This 
evaluation mixes implementation phenomena and some short-run impact phenomena.   
As with most academic conceptions of impact this study starts by asking the 
question, “What did the program do?” (Borus, 1979; 3).  More specifically, when 
discussing impact, this study asks:  “Is the building industry compliant with state or 
local building codes and regulations?”   The most commonly utilized definition of 
impact involves economic consequences, phenomena, and, for the most part, 
measurement at the individual program level.  In addition, impact also can be 
conceptualized as political impact at the government level.  Furthermore, societal 
impacts are composed or are an artifact of aggregating individual level information 
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(Meier 1994; Knaap, Kim, and Fitipaldi 1996; Ripley 1985; Machmias 1979, 1980).  
This study is not addressing impact only for the theoretical purpose of explaining why 
particular factors produce compliance, but for practical reasons as well.  Compliance 
has always been of utmost importance in regulatory policy.  This is due in part to such 
highly charged issues as public welfare, safety, and education.  At times, 
noncompliance has resulted in the welfare and safety of citizens being jeopardized.  
Thus, assessing the impacts of policy, both governmental and societal, are important 
activities for social scientists.   
Public policy may have several types of consequences.  The two most 
commonly discussed impacts are governmental and societal (Shull 1999).  
Governmental impacts refer to the effect of government actions on individuals or 
groups, such as the impact of environmental policy on the chemical industry.  Societal 
impacts refer to a much broader impact, such as the impact of environmental policy on 
the quality of life of poor Americans.  According to Shull (1999) societal outcomes are 
often associated with well-being or standard of living.  Developing measures of impact 
has often proven elusive to researchers, especially measures of societal impact. This 
study is primarily concerned with governmental impacts because, as noted above, it is 
very difficult to attain measures of societal impact.  
Before going any further, there is a need to draw a distinct line between policy 
outputs and policy outcomes.  Policy outputs are the things actually done by agencies 
in pursuance of policy decisions and statements.  The concepts of outputs focus one’s 
attention on such matters as amount of taxes collected, miles of highways built, 
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welfare benefits paid, traffic fines collected.  Outputs usually can be readily counted, 
totaled, and analyzed statistically.  Examining outputs may indicate, or seem to 
indicate, that a lot is being done to implement a policy. 
Policy outcomes, in contrast, are the consequences for society, intended and 
unintended, that stem from deliberate governmental action or inaction.  Social-welfare 
policies can be used to illustrate this concept.  It is fairly easy to measure welfare 
policy outputs such as amount of benefits paid, average level of benefits, and number 
of people assisted.  But what are the outcomes, or societal consequences, of these 
actions?  Do they increase personal security and contentment?  Do they reduce or 
enhance individual initiative?  While this line of questioning could continue, the point 
is made: outcomes are important but hard to determine.  Among other things, as 
students of public policy, we want to know whether policies are accomplishing their 
intended purposes, whether society is changing as a consequence of policy actions and 
not because of other factors such as private economic decisions, and whether it is 
changing as intended or in other ways.  Policy impacts are an amalgam of outputs and 
outcomes.   
Influences on Implementation and Impact. 
 Theories of public policy abound (see Dye 1966; Sabatier 1988; Meier 1994). 
This study borrows tenets from these theories, drawing especially from the work of 
Meier (1994).  The basic theme behind the theory in this study is that public policy 
results from the interaction of actors with internal and external factors and forces  
Figure 1.1 
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Important Factors in the Study of the Policy Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure proposes two major clusters of factors that should be considered in the 
analysis of public policy:  internal and external.  Internal factors include what happens 
inside government, and is concerned with government actors.  External factors consist 
of what happens outside government, with a primary emphasis on non-governmental 
actors. Governmental and non-governmental actors have the potential to exert political 
influence in policy-making. While this may seem like a simplistic representation, it 
does provide an overview of the most important variables and relationships to which 
researchers should be sensitive.  The clusters are partially independent and partially 
overlapping in that it is not always possible to delineate where one cluster begins to 
exert influence and the other cluster ceases to exert influence.  It is worth noting that 
the arrows, which signify influence or in some sense causation, run in both directions 
between the variable clusters.  This suggests not just that internal and external factors 
shape policy activity, but it also suggests that the various dimensions affect each other. 
In the paragraphs that follow I discuss the major concepts and conclude with a 
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discussion of the effect of these factors on policy implementation and impact at the 
“street” or local level (Lipsky 1980). 
Over time, regulatory policy has been viewed from three different perspectives 
(for complete discussions of these perspectives see Weingast and Moran 1983; Meier 
1985).  The first perspective views regulatory agencies as being vested with large 
amounts of discretion that plays the primary role in enforcement of regulatory policy.  
In this view professional values, policy expertise, bureaucratic entrepreneurs, and 
agency structure are all thought to affect policy outputs (Wilson 1980; Katzman 1980, 
Brehm and Gates 1997).  Going further, a second view argues that regulatory agencies 
are dominated by their environments; interest groups, legislative committees, 
economic forces, and technological change all are important in determining policy 
outputs (Stigler 1971; Lowi,1969; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1980).  The third and 
most recent perspective focuses upon political control of the bureaucracy.  In this 
principal-agent perspective, policy outputs are determined by political actors, most 
notably the president, Congress, and the courts (Wood and Waterman 1991; Shull and 
Garland 1995; and Durant 1992).   
Internal.  A major facet of importance to implementation and impact of 
public policies is the internal structure of agencies and government, such as 
standardization of employee behavior, agency leadership, budget adequacy of the 
agency, technical expertise of the agency, enforcement style of the agency, employee 
experience on the job, and employee satisfaction with the job.  This structure refers to 
the inside of agencies in both a structural and process sense.  Agencies have a 
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particular structure and a specific set of operative processes at any given time.  These 
facets lead them to implement policies that have general policy consequences, as does 
the pattern of relationships between these governmental units and non-governmental 
interests.  In addition, agencies also must deal with other institutions and actors inside 
government.  Not only do these specific features and actors require systematic 
attention, the interactions that take place within the internal environment of agencies 
deserve study as well.  
 External.  Another facet to be considered in this study of implementation and 
outcomes is the general environment external to government.  It is argued that all 
policy decisions are set in the context of general external environmental factors and 
that these factors are likely to influence a good deal of what else happens.  Students of 
bureaucracy traditionally have pointed to a variety of external or environmental factors 
that shape administrative behavior.  The political environment has the potential to 
shape administrative decisions.  Moreover, it has been suggested that interest groups 
or pressure groups influence administrative behavior (Meier 1993, Pertschuk 1982, 
Wood and Waterman 1993, Bernstein 1955).      
According to open systems theory, bureaucratic survival and effectiveness 
depend on external legitimacy.  As a result, bureaucracies are influenced by the 
environments in which they exist, and in response, they seek to manipulate those 
environments (Thompson 1967; Meier 1993).  The external environment has been 
described as composed of two broad types, task environments and political 
environments (Keiser and Soss 1998).  The task environment refers to the material 
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conditions that bureaucracies have to work with as they pursue their goals.  The 
political environment is self-explanatory, composed of actors outside government that 
exert political force upon agencies and inspectors. This study focuses upon a series of 
patterns involving a variety of factors (e.g., unemployment, industrial forces, growth, 
political pressure, interest group pressure) that may influence the policy process.  This 
analysis relies heavily on the various traditions of regulatory theory in relation to 
policy implementation and impact.  The focus is on these interrelationships in 
understanding why implementation and impact vary in regulatory enforcement.  
Focus of the Study 
The study of street-level bureaucrats began as an attempt to further expand the 
conceptualizations of the policy process to include an often-overlooked factor, the 
actual policy implementers.  According to Lipsky (1976, 136), street-level bureaucrats 
are “individuals in organizational roles requiring frequent and significant contacts with 
citizens.”  Specifically, a street-level bureaucrat is defined as a public employee whose 
work is characterized by the following three conditions:  (1) he or she is called upon to 
interact constantly with citizens in the regular course of the job, (2) although he or she 
works within a bureaucratic structure, independence on the job is fairly extensive.  
One component of this independence is discretion in making decisions; but 
independence is not limited to discretion.  The attitude and general approach of the 
street-level bureaucrat toward the citizen may affect the individual significantly.  
These considerations are broader than the term discretion suggests, and (3) the 
potential impact on citizens with whom he or she deals is fairly extensive.  Lipsky 
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(1980) describes teachers, police officers, and social workers as typical local level 
street-level bureaucrats.  The present study focuses on building inspectors, who are 
another important group of street-level bureaucrats.    
Bureaucrats, especially line or street-level personnel, have often been viewed 
in a negative light and are regarded as “low-level employees” (Lipsky 1980).  But, 
given the reliance upon state and local governments to implement federal mandates, 
these personnel have become important to the success of programs.  They often have 
great discretion to decide both whether and how a particular policy (often a rule or 
statute) will be implemented.  With the growth of local government (both policies and 
employees), it is more likely that citizen contact will be with a street-level bureaucrat, 
rather than a high-ranking government administrator.  The reality is that multi-tiered 
governance has led to an increased role for street-level bureaucrats. 
The justification for studying street-level bureaucrats is straightforward.  To 
begin with, street-level bureaucrats are often overlooked in the policy process.  As 
noted earlier, numerous studies continue to observe only administrators and elected 
policy makers.  Second, street-level bureaucrats, and usually local rather than national 
ones at that, are the people responsible for actually delivering governmental policy.  
Third, their jobs are full of daily decisions that have the potential to influence policy 
outcomes.  Fourth, there continues to be divergent findings concerning the nature of 
bureaucratic actions.  Some scholars, for example, find that inspectors generally go by 
the book, while others find that inspectors are quick to exercise discretion (Vogel 
1986; Brakeman , 1985; Bardach and Kagan 1982; Stigler 1971; Noll 1985).  Lastly, 
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despite its importance, there has been only gradual theoretical and empirical progress 
in research concerning street-level implementation (see Lipsky 1980; Levine, 
Musheno and Palumbo 1980; Handler 1986; Musheno 1986; Meier, Stewart and 
England 1991; Kelly 1994; Brehm and Gates 1997; and Smith 1997).   
This research empirically examines the policy process at the street level, with a 
primary focus upon implementation and impact.  It is important that the public policy 
field recognizes that street-level bureaucrats, the decisions they make, their methods of 
dealing with problems, and the tools they apply in their jobs, affect public policy in 
their particular domains.  This is not to say that public policy does not often originate 
in national policy-making institutions or that upper-level administrators hold no 
influence over policy implementation.  Instead, it is recognition that street-level 
personnel serve an important role in interpreting and applying American public policy.  
This study investigates street-level public servants, what they do, and how 
effectively they handle the challenges of their difficult jobs.  In various settings in the 
United States, these street-level bureaucrats are confronted with some of the most 
critical and controversial problems facing the nation.  These individuals are “in the 
trenches” working to make sure that regulations are being enforced to make the nation 
a safer place to live. More specifically, this study helps rectify the current status of 
local-level policy implementation, one in which there has been little progress in 
understanding these workers, the behaviors they exhibit in doing their jobs, and how to 
improve their job function. 
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Research Questions 
Beginning from the standpoint that the study of street-level bureaucrats offers the 
most promise in better explaining policy implementation and impact, I address several 
interrelated questions about implementation and impact.  First, do regulatory 
inspectors exercise discretion?  Second, to what degree are regulatory inspectors’ 
behavior congruent with regulatory agency officials objectives or policy (e.g., are the 
inspectors exercising discretion)?  Third, what factors influence regulatory inspectors 
to exercise discretion?  In particular, this study examines the effects that internal (e.g., 
agency leadership, budgetary capacity) and external variables (e.g., political pressure, 
interest group pressure) have on the choice of inspectors to exercise discretion.  This 
first set of interrelated questions examines issues related to implementation behavior.  
Specifically, it allows me to examine the extent to which the actions of implementing 
officials (street-level bureaucrats) are consistent with policy decisions.  Furthermore, 
this focus allows an examination of the factors that shape implementation behavior of 
regulatory inspectors.     
Going further, this study introduces a new empirical measure that makes this 
project unique in public policy studies.  Specifically, I examine the level of policy 
congruence between building departments and street-level inspectors as a predictor of 
industry compliance with regulatory policy.  There are several questions that I will 
explore that are related to industry compliance, and thus, policy impact.  The first, as 
mentioned above, what influence does inspector discretion play in industry 
compliance with regulations?  Second, are there alternative factors that have the 
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potential to influence the compliance of regulated entities with regulations?  In short, 
is it possible that building department enforcement philosophies, departmental 
capacity for enforced compliance, and local situational factors are determining factors 
in industry compliance?  This set of questions potentially helps to determine what 
impact these various factors have on regulated entities, focusing on the strategies 
pursued by a wide range of actors and the strategic actions that take place among these 
actors in regulatory policymaking.  The above questions are quite general and there 
are a number of issues involved in the questions posed above that will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters.   
Significance of the Research 
 This study is unique in two ways.  First, it goes much further than previous 
studies of inspector discretion.  The analysis does not become entangled in the 
normative debate concerning the merits of discretion. Rather, this study focuses on the 
factors that influence the decision of regulatory inspectors to exercise discretion.  
Moreover, this study addresses regulatory inspector discretion in an empirical manner.  
It also is unique in that it considers the role that policy congruence between local 
building departments and local inspectors play in the achievement of compliance from 
the regulated industry, rather than just focusing on enforcement styles.  This is not to 
say that studies focusing on enforcement styles have not born much fruit.  There is 
much evidence to the contrary (May and Burby, 1998; May and Feeley, 2000).  
Rather, it is to say that there is possibly another avenue by which to explore factors 
that influence regulatory compliance. 
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One often-overlooked regulatory task is the function that state and local 
governments perform in enforcing the building codes that protect life, safety, and 
property from loss or damage.  This task is considered more important in some areas 
than others (e.g., those at higher risks from earthquakes and other natural disasters). 
Given the variation in the risk from natural disasters, there are different levels of 
attention to the building code in various parts of the country. Yet, even where mass 
destruction results from these natural disasters, it is hard to generate and sustain 
attention to regulatory policies that could lessen the impact of these tragedies.  Highly 
visible natural disasters relate to the much more mundane task of building codes. 
May and Feeley (1999) have aptly described regulatory functions as “taking 
place in the backwaters of state and local government.”  State governments are largely 
responsible for public safety.  However, it should be pointed out that just because 
regulatory issues fail to achieve high salience, it is no reason to ignore them.  To the 
contrary, ignoring them insures that as long as natural disasters continue to occur, 
failure to enforce building codes will inevitably lead to greater physical damage and 
possibly injury or loss of life.  
Federal law has exerted very little influence on the administration of the 
building code.  For the most part enactment and enforcement of the building code has 
remained a purely state and local concern.  More recently, states (roughly 33 out of 
50) have begun to exercise preemptive power in the enforcement of building codes.  
The federal government has played virtually no part in the development of modern 
building codes because issues of health, safety, welfare, and morals remain largely 
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state and local government concerns.   One can see with limited federal and 
involvement, state and local governments and especially local building officials often 
operate unfettered in their jobs. 
The National Board of Fire Underwriters, a private organization, published the 
recommended National Building Code in 1905, which was intended to guide local 
governments in their attempt to enact legislation regulating the manner and types of 
construction within their boundaries.  The code was the result of a number of severe 
losses suffered by fire insurance companies in the latter part of the 19th Century and 
the early part of the 20th Century.  The recommended National Building Code was the 
only model code in existence until 1927 when the Pacific Coast Building Officials’ 
Conference, the immediate predecessors to the International Conference of Building 
Officials, published its Uniform Building Code.  This code, still in existence today, is 
used extensively in the western states.  While the National Building Code has become 
obsolete, the Uniform Building Code still remains. 
 In 1945, the Southern Standard Building Code (now the Standard Building Code) 
was published by the Southern Building Code Congress.  This code, still in use today, 
is predominantly in effect in the southeastern and southwestern states.  A third model 
code, the Basic Building Code (now the Basic/National Building Code), was published 
by Building Officials and Code Administrators International in 1950.  It is most 
widely established in the northeastern and mid-western states. 
All three of these model codes are structured similarly.  The development and 
change within the codes themselves are also very similar.  All three publish new 
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editions on a three-year cycle.  The manner in which modifications to the codes are 
enacted varies from organization to organization, but it is fair to say that they all 
attempt to keep up with the rapidly changing field of modern building construction.  
All three code organizations also employ a staff which is available to local 
municipalities who subscribe to their services for questions and advice (Legal Aspects 
of Code Administration, 1984).   
It is posited here that the study of building code implementation can contribute 
to theories of discretion in regulatory bureaucracies.  Building code implementation 
offers a particularly helpful case for studying the use of bureaucratic discretion 
because (a) it is a policy that is implemented by state and local governments and (b) it 
is a policy that vests high levels of discretionary authority in state administrators.  
Although the problems and challenges in building regulation are often ignored in the 
study of regulation, they are illustrative of the more basic issues of day-to-day 
enforcement or regulatory policies in local settings.   
 
Overview of the Project    
Chapter Two introduces the theory and conceptualization behind my hybrid 
model of bureaucratic decision-making.  Chapter Three provides a discussion of the 
data, methods, and measurement of the specific concepts and variables. Chapter Four 
analyzes the various factors that influence inspector discretion.  Chapter Five contains 
analyses of the various factors that influence industry compliance with the regulatory 
policies.  Chapter Six provides an overall discussion of the results of this study.  In 
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addition, this chapter provides the conclusions and discusses the implications of this 
research, and it offers suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2:  Theory and Concepts 
 
 This chapter surveys scholarly thinking and past empirical research on discretion 
in regulatory enforcement and regulatory compliance.  The discussion of past 
scholarly work has a twofold purpose.  First, the chapter highlights some of the 
unsettled controversies among academics that are relevant to the analyses in 
subsequent chapters.  Second, past theories of discretion and compliance suggest 
certain a priori expectations about the nature of bureaucratic discretion in regulatory 
policy, aiding in the development of hypotheses and expectations with respect to 
bureaucratic decision-making and compliance.   
 Some scholars have concluded that bureaucrats are resistant to change, and that 
they are often unresponsive to internal and external pressures (Sundquist 1981; Lowi 
1979; Wilson 1967).  Other scholars claim that bureaucracies do respond to internal 
and external pressures, but they only do so under certain circumstances (Lipsky 1980; 
Kagan 1994; Scholz 1994; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Downs 1967).  Thus, this 
chapter emphasizes past scholarly work and examines bureaucratic responsiveness to 
internal and external pressures.  The first part of this chapter presents a theoretical 
framework, called open-systems theory, for understanding bureaucratic discretion in a 
democratic system.  However, this chapter also integrates tenets of top-down and 
bottom-up theory, both of which have proven useful in explaining bureaucratic 
discretion and regulatory compliance.  The integration of these two theories leads to a 
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conceptual and hybrid model of bureaucratic decision-making that will aid in 
understanding inspector behavior and the role that regulatory inspectors play in 
compliance.  Lastly, this chapter concludes with hypotheses and expectations 
regarding factors that influence inspector discretion and regulatory compliance.  
Theories of Policy-Making 
Over time political scientists have developed numerous models, theories, 
approaches and schemes for analyzing policymaking (for an excellent evaluation of 
the various approaches to the study of public policy see Sabatier 1999).  To be sure, 
Anderson (2000) has criticized political scientists for displaying more facility and zeal 
for theorizing about public policy making than for actually studying policy and the 
policymaking process.  Ceteris paribus, theories and concepts are still beneficial in 
directing studies of public policy.  Moreover, theories and concepts facilitate 
communication among scholars.  In short, theories and concepts help scholars 
systematically study the policymaking process.  Scholars thus have some guidelines 
and criteria of relevance to focus their effort and to prevent aimless meandering 
through fields of political data.  Before going into a more specific discussion of policy 
making, it is important to define policymaking.  
Policymaking is different from decision-making.  While there is no singularly 
agreed on definition of policymaking, most are similarly structured.  Policymaking 
typically encompasses a flow and pattern of action that extends over time and includes 
many decisions, some routine and some not so routine.  Rarely will a policy be 
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synonymous with a single decision.  It is the course of action, the pattern or regularity 
that defines policy, rather than an isolated event.   
The theoretical approaches discussed below and utilized throughout this study 
include systems theory and process theory both of which are interrelated.  They are 
useful to the extent that they direct our attention to important political phenomena, 
clarify and organize our thinking, and suggest explanations for political activity or, in 
this case, public policies.  Utilizing these approaches has several advantages:  (1) the 
systems and process approaches not only focus attention on the environment, but they 
also focus attention on the officials and institutions who make policy decisions and on 
the factors that influence and condition their actions; (2) the sequential nature of these 
approaches helps one capture and comprehend the flow of action of the actual policy 
process; (3) these approaches are flexible and open to refinement and change; (4) the 
approaches present a dynamic and developmental, rather than static and cross-
sectional, view of the policy process; and, (5) neither of the approaches is “culture 
bound.”  Each lends itself to manageable comparisons, such as how various policies 
are implemented or how impacts vary across various policy domains.     
 Open-systems model.  Public policy may be viewed as a political system’s 
response to support and demands arising from its environment.  The political system, 
as Easton defines it, comprises those identifiable and interrelated institutions and 
activities (what we usually think of as governmental institutions and political 
processes) in a society that make authoritative allocation of values (decisions) that are 
binding on society.  The environment consists of all phenomena--the social system, 
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the economic system, and the biological setting--that are external to the boundaries of 
the political system.  Thus, at least analytically, one can separate the political system 
from all other components of a society (Easton 1957).   
 Inputs into the political system from the environment consist of demands and 
supports.  Demands are the claims for action that individuals and groups make to 
satisfy their interests and values.  Support is rendered when groups and individuals 
abide by election results, pay taxes, obey laws, and otherwise accept decisions and 
actions undertaken by the political system in response to demands.  The amount of 
support for a political system indicates the extent to which it is regarded as legitimate 
or as authoritative and binding on its citizens. 
 Outputs of the political system include laws, rules, judicial decisions, and the like.  
Regarded as the authoritative allocation of values, they constitute public policy.  The 
concept of feedback indicates that public policies (or outputs) made at a given time 
may subsequently alter the environment and the demands arising there from, as well as 
the political system itself.  Policy outputs may produce new demands which lead to 
further outputs and so on in a never-ending flow of public policy.   
Open systems theory developed out of a need for scholars to analyze a political 
system in dynamic terms.  By doing this, not only do we see that a political system 
gets something done through its outputs, but we also are sensitized to the fact that 
what the system does may influence each successive stage of behavior.  Systems 
theory enables scholars to interpret political processes as a continuous and interlinked 
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flow of behavior (see Figure 2.1 for a basic graphic representation of an open systems 
model).   
In the Eastonian tradition, open systems theories of administration suggest that 
implementation of policies should reflect the systematic effects of structural, 
environmental, and political conditions on bureaucratic discretion.  In the policy 
process administrators distribute benefits in relative obscurity.  Nevertheless, 
bureaucratic decisions that may appear unremarkable actually play a critical role in the 
politics of “who gets what, when, and how” (Laswell 1936).  Public agencies write 
rules that dictate how general legislation will be used in specific situations, and they 
apply these rules to particular individuals (Meier 1993; Kerwin 1994).  Through both 
of these processes, they refashion the broad mandates of legislatures into the policy 
outcomes that citizens actually encounter (Goodsell 1981).  In this sense, policy 
implementation represents a continuation of the political process--a form of 
“policymaking by other means” (Lineberry 1977, 71).  Thus we are led to think of 
policymaking in terms of a cyclical process.  The cyclical process is discussed below.  
Process model.  The “stages heuristic,” as this framework has been called, has 
been one of the most influential frameworks for understanding the policy process.  As 
developed by Jones (1970), Anderson (1975), and Brewer and deLeon (1983), it 
divided the policy process into a series of stages.  Various treatments of the policy 
process lay out stages of that process with various nominal labels attached to help 
organize discussion and analysis.  Such stage-oriented discussions do not form the 
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direct basis for hypothesizing causal relationships although such hypotheses may 
emerge.  Rather, they are approximated chronological and logical guides for observers 
Figure 2.1 
Open-Systems Model 
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who want to see important activities in some ordered pattern or sequence.  
Such organizational helpers are useful, in fact essential, for anyone trying to plow 
through the complexities of policymaking and policy analysis. At best, such maps--
even with their rough spots and simplifications--lend some clarity to the observer as he 
A 
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SYSTEM 
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or she grapples with a complicated and sometimes murky set of interactions and 
processes.   
To repeat various authors’ versions of policy stages and the policy process 
would be an exercise in redundancy.  There are many versions, most of which bear 
striking resemblance to each previous version.  Let it suffice that most analysts agree 
on the central activities requiring attention.  While there are differences, Figure 2.2 
provides a guide to the stages of the policy process.  Figure 2.2 also lays out the basic 
flow of policy stages, major functional activities that occur in those stages, and the 
products that can be expected at each stage if a product is forthcoming.  Naturally, a 
policy process may be aborted at any stage.  Beginning a process does not guarantee 
that products will emerge or that a stage will be “completed” and so lead to the next 
stage.  Figure 2.2 presents the general flow of stages, activities, and products that can 
be expected in a policy that is generated and transformed into a viable and ongoing 
program.  “Stages” are the names attached to major clusters of activities that result in 
identifiable products if they reach conclusion.  “Functional activities” are the major 
subroutines of actions and interactions engaged in by policy actors.  “Products” are the 
output, or end result, of any general stage.  As suggested earlier, many of these 
activities merit scholarly attention.  However, this study focuses on the latter stages of 
this process (implementation and impact) and what factors influence these stages, the 
activities that take place within these stages, and the actors that operate within these 
stages.    
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FIGURE 2.2 
THE POLICY PROCESS 
 
Interrelationship of Political System and Policy Process 
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Note: Actor importance varies at different stages in the policy process; 
includes environment (political culture, pluralism, apathy, economy and other 
elements outside government, non governmental actors) and structure (governmental 
actors’ preferences, resources, activities, federalism, constitution, checks and 
balances).  (Source:  Steven A. Shull) 
 
 
Theories of Bureaucratic Decision-Making 
There is a general consensus that over time the complexity of government has 
increased (Light 1995).  The roles and powers of administrators at all levels of 
government have expanded in the policy-making process (Lipsky 1980; Kerwin 1994; 
Goodsell 1984).  Bureaucrats have become policy makers in their own right 
(Shumavon and Hibbeln 1986).  However, given this role of expanded government 
and bureaucratic proliferation, there has been little empirical progress in understanding 
bureaucratic behavior or the bureaucratic role in public policymaking. 
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As noted above, there has been little progress:  Instead research has taken a 
normative tack, and it became involved in the debate over the “good” or “bad” nature 
of bureaucrats.  This debate has no doubt shaped many of the theories of bureaucratic 
decision-making.  Depending upon which side of the normative controversy that 
scholars chose, they were likely to write justifications that were in support of their 
particular position regarding bureaucratic behavior.  This enduring debate in political 
science and public administration, concerning the role that politics and discretion 
should play in the administration of policies, had begun as early as the 1800s and it 
continues.  What follows is a brief synopsis of the various theories of bureaucratic 
decision-making.   
It has been shown that regulatory inspectors often enjoy a certain degree of 
autonomy as they exercise discretionary authority that has been granted to them by 
legislative and executive institutions (Kerwin 1994; Lipsky 1980; Brehm and Gates 
1997).  There is a general consensus that regulatory inspectors exercise some degree 
of discretion.  However, and as noted above, the agreement among scholars stops there 
and the normative arguments about the good or bad nature of bureaucratic behavior 
begin.   
Many of the works concerning the negative aspects of bureaucratic behavior 
flow directly from Woodrow Wilson (1888) and his politics-administration 
dichotomy.  The dichotomy implies that the relation between elected institutions and 
the bureaucracy should be purely top-down and essentially static through time.  
Politics and administration are assumed to be separable, hierarchically arranged 
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endeavors.  Elected politicians make policy for administrations through their non-
elected subordinates in the bureaucracy.  However, these subordinates should not be 
susceptible to any political influences beyond initial lawmaking.  This view also 
implies that policy-making should be detailed and explicit so that policies can be 
administered without ambiguity by experts in the bureaucracy.  According to this 
view, elected officials should not direct the bureaucracy in a manner inconsistent with 
original legislative intent.  And, elected officials should not delegate policy-making 
authority to the bureaucracy.  The underlying assumption is that bureaucracy is not a 
representative institution and that all bureaucratic policymaking occurs beyond 
legitimate democratic channels.   
Many of these works concerning bureaucrats have been case studies and they 
have clustered around the negative aspects of human behavior (Wilson 1967; Lowi 
1979; Sundquist 1981).  For the most part, these scholars have suggested that 
discretion violates the basic tenets of democracy as set forth by the Constitution.  Lowi 
(1979) went so far as to describe the exercise of discretion as “policy without law.”  
Essentially these studies have posited that discretion opens the possibility of abuse of 
too much discretionary authority with the result being the serving of narrow interests.   
While there has been a lot of attention focused on negative behavior, other 
scholars have argued that bureaucratic discretion is not a bad thing (Downs 1967; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Scholz 1994; Kagan 1994).  These studies have 
typically argued for the necessity of the flexibility needed in dealing with different 
situations, primarily to adapt them to local concerns.  Lipsky (1980) makes a very 
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strong case for this perspective.  He has argued that since bureaucratic resources are 
scarce, workers are overwhelmed by the demands placed upon them, and must 
develop coping strategies.  This research highlights the propensity of the bureaucrat to 
serve the easiest client as opposed to the client that demands more attention and 
resources.  In this vein, all of the strategies pursued by the self-interested bureaucrat 
are intended to make their lives easier rather than more complicated.  Still others have 
contended that bureaucrats make decisions to benefit clients with broad legislative or 
administrative policy goals (Meier, Stewart and England 1991; Handler 1986).   
As highlighted above, two perspectives, clearly the extremes, top-down or 
principal-agency and bottom-up or street-level decision- making, have dominated 
theories of bureaucratic decision-making.  It should be recognized that the principal-
agency approach considers discretion illegitimate and that the street-level perspective 
considers discretion legitimate or simply a reality.  Given the discussion above, it 
becomes quite evident that scholars cannot agree, in a normative sense, about the role 
that bureaucrats should play in policy making.  There may be no definitive answer to 
the normative question, “Is discretion good or bad?”  However, the absence of a clear 
answer should not stop investigation of the topic.  To the contrary, this disagreement 
highlights further the need for greater examination of the actions and behaviors of 
street-level bureaucrats and how those actions influence policymaking. 
   This study takes an objective approach to the study of bureaucratic behavior.  
Moreover, it does not seek to make normative judgments regarding bureaucratic 
behavior, but rather it attempts to explain bureaucratic behavior using aspects of both 
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the top-down and bottom-up approaches.  It is necessary to examine both theories 
critically (top-down and bottom-up) to further understand the tenets of each to fully 
develop a theory that can explain bureaucratic behavior and help in our understanding 
of policymaking.  
 Principal-Agency or Top-Down Theory.  Numerous studies of bureaucracy have 
focused on political control of the bureaucracy.  Most of these studies have ranged 
from studying one policy actor or, in a few cases, numerous policy actors.  In most 
cases, the extant top-down literature has examined the president, the Congress, or in 
some instances the courts (Wood and Waterman 1994; Moe 1982, 1985; Sabatier and 
Pelkey 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  As noted in Chapter One, principal-
agency or top-down theory developed during the early 1980s.  The basic tenet guiding 
top-down theory is that elected officials have political incentives to control the 
bureaucracy.  In the top-down literature, bureaucrats have been portrayed as irrational, 
inefficient, and unresponsive.  It has widely been argued that the exercise of power by 
bureaucrats is undemocratic and usually arbitrary and capricious.  Bureaucrats are 
often viewed as the source of all problems in policy-making.  To be sure, the evils of 
discretion have long been discussed in a normative fashion in the extant top-down 
studies.  This normative debate began with how much policymaking authority 
Congress should delegate to the bureaucracy.  While not the first, Theodore Lowi 
(1979) suggested that broad, ill-defined delegations of congressional authority left the 
bureaucracy unaccountable and democracy imperiled.  James Q. Wilson (1967) was 
more concerned with policy outputs when he argued that bureaucratic power had not 
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resulted in the formulation of coherent policies.  He followed this up in 1975 by 
identifying the expansion of administrative power as the “bureaucratic problem.”  
Top-down theory has broad based appeal because it often uses quantitative data.  
Furthermore, scholars have developed considerable evidence that elected officials 
exert a great deal of influence over the bureaucracy (Moe 1982, 1985; Weingast and 
Moran 1983; Cohen 1985; Scholz and Wei 1986; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 
1991; Hansen 1990; Wood 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1993; 
Waterman and Wood 1992, 1993; and Wood and Anderson 1993). 
The top-down perspective usually begins with the selection of a policy 
decision, and then it examines the extent to which the programmatic objectives are 
being achieved.  Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) highlight the essential features of a 
top-down approach which starts with a policy decision by governmental officials and 
before asking the following questions:  (1) To what extent are the actions of the 
implementing officials and target groups consistent with policy decisions?  (2) To 
what extent were the objectives obtained over time (i.e., were the impacts consistent 
with objectives)? (3) What were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and 
impacts, both those relevant to the official policy and other politically significant 
ones? and (4) How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience?   
Not covered by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), but certainly a tenet of the top-down 
approach, is the fact that it emphasizes democratic governance through elected 
officials (Goodsell 1995; Brehm and Gates 1997).   
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Bureaucratic Discretion or Bottom-Up Theory.  Also discussed in Chapter One 
was bottom-up perspective or street-level decision-making. This perspective emerged 
in the late 1970s and, as suggested by its name, it is quite different from the top-down 
approach.  Numerous scholars have emphasized this perspective in their research 
(Lipsky 1971, 1977, 1980; Ingram 1978; Barrett and Fudge 1981; Brehm and Gates 
1997).  While negative stereotypes of discretion abound, bottom-up scholars have 
recently brought more positive views of discretion to the forefront.  A primary 
argument put forth by scholars advocating the use of discretion is that discretion is 
needed to adapt to given situations facing the agency.  According to these scholars, the 
importance of discretion for effective enforcement far outweighs the threats of 
“capture” and corruption that arise when field officers have discretion.  For example, 
Francis Rourke (1984:37), stated, “…without administrative discretion, effective 
government would be impossible in the infinitely varied and rapidly changing 
environment of twentieth century society.”  While others have argued that 
bureaucratic discretion is needed in modern and complex society (Bryner 1967; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).  Furthermore, Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan 
(1982) have argued that bureaucratic discretion provides needed flexibility in the 
regulatory process.   
The bottom-up approach allows one to identify a specific policy network or 
implementation structure.  Second, and probably most important, because the focus is 
on the strategies pursued by a wide range of actors, a bottom-up perspective is able to 
give full consideration to all actors involved and the strategic interaction that takes 
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place among those actors, rather than focusing upon the strategies of program 
proponents. 
Essentially, the bottom-up perspective is most useful where there is no 
dominant piece of legislation but rather a large number of relatively independent 
actors, or where one is primarily interested in the dynamics of different local 
situations.  Unlike the top-down perspective, the bottom-up approach places much less 
emphasis on democratic governance, given the propensity for civil servants to be 
relatively unaccountable to elected officials (for instances of discretionary actions 
such as rulemaking see Kerwin 1994).  The bottom-up approach assumes that 
bureaucrats have greater discretion than does the top-down approach.  
A Hybrid Model of Bureaucratic Decision-Making.  Both approaches (top-
down and bottom-up) have intuitive appeal.  Richard Elmore (1985) has argued 
eloquently that researchers should stop trying to settle on a single framework for 
analyzing public policy.  The important issue is not whether the framework of analysis 
is right or wrong.  It is less important to agree about a single method for the analysis of 
problems than it is to be clear about the consequences under which one framework 
might be adopted over another.   
Like Sabatier (1986), this study posits that we need to consider both 
approaches (top-down and bottom-up) or a synthesis of both approaches, because both 
perspectives offer promise for the study of public policy.  To be sure, numerous 
scholars have used both the top-down and bottom-up approaches in concert, arguing 
that neither should be used in complete isolation (Shull and Garland 1995; Fiorino 
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1991; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983).  This study employs a synthesis of the two 
models to explain inspector behavior, the principal-agent or top-down model and the 
bottom-up model, as noted above, both of which have support in existing research.  
This study employs tenets of a top-down approach.  Specifically, it examines 
regulatory inspectors’ policy congruence with higher level (e.g., agency) policy 
objectives.  Following the synthesis of Mazmanian (1986), this top-down approach 
will allow the study to focus upon the following: (1) the effects of socio-economic 
(and other changes) external to the policy network/subsystem of actors’ resources and 
strategies; (2) the attempts by various actors to manipulate governmental programs in 
order to achieve their objectives over time; and (3) actors’ efforts to use various policy 
instruments as they learn from experience.   
Through the bottom-up approach, this study examines the strategies employed 
by relevant actors as they attempt to deal with the issue consistent with their objective 
(e.g., obtaining compliance).   This bottom-up approach allows systematic 
examination of factors that have the potential to influence regulatory compliance.  The 
bottom-up approach is particularly appropriate in regulatory policy domains where 
there is no dominant piece of legislation, where there are relatively large numbers of 
independent actors, and where there is great variance in different local situations, all of 
which apply in this study.   
  In the context of a complex system of policy implementation, it is not enough to 
just determine the nature of bureaucratic behavior (e.g., do inspectors exercise 
discretion?) or to determine the impacts of specific policies (e.g., is the regulated 
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industry compliant?).  The purpose of this research is to go much further.  This study 
instead will determine the factors that influence inspectors’ discretion and identify 
factors that influence industry compliance.   
 As noted above, the exercise of bureaucratic discretion has been a central and 
enduring issue in the fields of public administration and public policy.  Questions 
about the scope of bureaucratic discretion, how and to what extent it should be 
controlled, and how it can be reconciled with the values of democratic governance 
have been and will continue to be debated.  Moreover, regulatory compliance has been 
a salient topic of discussion in public administration and public policy circles.  
Questions abound about the most appropriate method(s) for achieving compliance 
from regulated industries to questions regarding the reasons for noncompliance with 
regulations.  Before discussing either of these concepts (discretion and compliance) 
any further, it is important to define.      
Discretion.  This study is primarily concerned with regulation at the local 
level.  As noted by Lipsky (1980) and a host of other scholars, street-level workers are 
often confronted with nebulous, complicated, and, in some cases, dangerous situations.  
In performing their duties, street-level bureaucrats often face competing factors which 
have the potential to influence their decisions.  In weighing these factors, workers are 
exercising discretion.  As one can see, discretion is at the heart of street-level worker 
decision-making.  Many public employees must exercise discretion to adequately 
fulfill the duties of their respective jobs.  
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 Discretion has certainly been an important issue from the perspective of the 
individual street-level worker.  In this context, Vinzant and Crothers (1998, 37) define 
discretion as “the ability to make responsible decisions,” and “the power of free 
decision or latitude of choice within certain legal bounds.”  Still others have defined 
discretion as latitude in creating formal rules and procedures as discretion (Meier 
1993; Kerwin 1994).  Moreover, others have considered the adaptation of street-level 
bureaucrats to local situations as discretion (Lipsky 1980; Keiser and Soss 1998).  
This study views the adaptation of regulatory inspectors to various enforcement 
situations as discretion.  These definitions provide a useful starting point for exploring 
a number of important dimensions of frontline worker discretion. 
 First, the preceding definition of discretion embodies the concept of choice.  
Discretionary acts involve making choices among alternatives.  The decision-maker 
has latitude in making choices in the sense that no one factor forces the selection of 
one alternative versus all others.  It is the judgment of the choice maker, then, rather 
than some mechanistic process that explains the selection of one particular alternative. 
 Second, the definition suggests that although the decision-maker has latitude, 
discretion is constrained by external factors.  Discretion is more than autonomous 
choice making; it involves making decisions within certain legal bounds or responsible 
criteria.  While no factor may be causing a particular selection, the range of 
discretionary alternatives is bound by external variables.  Choices are not made at will 
or with complete freedom.  Rather, discretion is limited.   
     
38
 Third, the concept of discretion implies that there is (or may be) variation among 
the factors that constrain discretion.  That is, the dictionary definition does not indicate 
that there are specific legal bounds or detailed criteria by which responsible decisions 
can be determined in all cases. Instead, there may be differences among individuals, 
groups, communities, agencies, clients, or other actors in a particular situation in terms 
of how they would define the constraints on discretion. 
 A fourth aspect of discretion offered here does not derive from the definition 
offered earlier; it is derived from direct observations of street-level workers in action.  
Discretion manifests itself in two somewhat distinct dimensions: process (the means 
of how a goal is to be accomplished) and outcome (the ends or what goal is to be 
sought).  While this distinction between process and outcomes is in one sense a highly 
artificial one, it can be an analytically useful way to think about the kinds of choices 
that street-level public servants are called upon to make (Vinzant and Crothers 1998; 
Crothers and Vinzant 1994).   
It is, for example, sometimes necessary for workers to make decisions about 
what to do.  There may be a range of options that can be seen as responsible or within 
certain legal bounds in a given situation, so the worker has to decide which outcome 
or objective to pursue.  Such discretion is termed outcome discretion.  Workers also 
are called upon to exercise discretion in deciding how to achieve a goal.  In some 
cases, law, routine, procedure, or some other factor may require the outcome or 
objective to be sought, but there is a range of means by which the goal can be realized.  
Such discretion is termed process discretion.  Process and outcome discretion can be 
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exercised singly or together.  In other words, sometimes workers exercise both 
outcome and process discretion in the same situation when they must make choices 
about both what will be done and how it will be done. 
 In short, discretion is anything but simple.  Discretion is constrained choice 
among competing alternatives; it may involve decisions about what to do, how to do 
it, or both.  As such, discretion is a neutral concept in that it is neither good nor bad in 
and of itself.  Instead, it is the context of its use that establishes its meaning and 
reasonableness.   
As highlighted above, discretion is either considered illegitimate (in top-down 
models), legitimate as such (in bottom-up models), or simply recognized as a reality.  
This study accepts this second view and does not accentuate only the negative aspects 
of human nature.  As noted by Brehm and Gates (1997), it is largely meaningless to 
think of agencies as organizations under centralized control.  The bureaucrats studied 
by Kaufman (1960), Lipsky (1980), and others exercise wide latitude over policy.  
Discretion comes into play throughout the many stages of the policy-making process, 
especially at the implementation level.  Furthermore, they suggest that it is also largely 
meaningless to think of bureaucracies as unitary actors with homogeneous 
preferences.  To the extent that bureaucrats hold homogenous preferences among 
themselves and wield significant degrees of discretion about how to achieve those 
preferences, agencies will never behave as a cohesive unit.   
This general definition and discussion of discretion raises several important 
questions.  First, under what circumstances do street-level bureaucrats exercise 
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discretion? Or, why do some bureaucrats exercise discretion and others do not?  Why 
do we not as a society simply eliminate their discretion and thereby avoid the whole 
problem of having to determine whether it is reasonable or appropriate? 
It is posited here that reasons beyond laziness or an underlying wish to destroy 
the agency’s mission motivates street-level workers to exercise discretion.  Thus it is 
not always self-serving reasons that lead inspectors to clash with prescribed laws and 
agency policies.  Street-level bureaucrats do not act in concert with or counter to 
agency wishes because of laziness or subversion; they act because they often have a 
different interpretation of outcomes and because they are possibly being responsive to 
different principals other than those thought of in the traditional principal-agent 
models.  In other words, while traditional principal-agent theorists (e.g., Moe 1997; 
Downs 1966) assume that executives and management incentives and rules are in the 
best interest of the policy goals of the entire agency, they often are not.  This 
reasoning is flawed, because it assumes a single hierarchical principal.  
 As with many instances in social science, the real world is not always neat and 
easily explained with a simple model.  In practice, there are multiple principals that 
street-level bureaucrats may choose to be responsive to.  The sheer nature of street-
level employment requires continual contact with the public, and it may lead to the 
public becoming a principal, a phenomenon which is much different than the 
traditional hierarchical principal perspective.  This reliance upon the public for cues 
may lead to the bending or breaking of rules of the hierarchical principals.  There is a 
definite propensity for this to happen when there is a disagreement between the 
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definition of successful outcomes of elected officials and upper agency personnel and 
the outcomes at the street level.  What is viewed by traditional public administration 
models as negative use of discretion by managers and lawmakers may be perceived as 
a positive use of discretion by the street-level worker because both are viewing the 
success of a different principal.   
 Disagreement among principals in an organization may explain why street-level 
workers choose to bend, ignore, or break the rules set by the traditional hierarchical 
principals.  This explains why some behavior which appears to be in the best interest 
of the client does not necessarily mean following the agency rules to meet agency 
goals.  Other goals offer a counter “incentive” to following the traditional hierarchical 
principal.  That does not necessarily mean that street-level workers are engaged in 
activities to thwart or harm an agency’s mission.  Rather, they are engaged in what is 
viewed as “positive” shirking or sabotage.   
In an enhanced principal agency model, Brehm and Gates (1997) suggest that 
street-level workers respond to policies in one of three ways: they work, shirk, or 
sabotage agency policy.  To summarize the authors, when street-level bureaucrats 
“follow” the rules, they are working, and working is viewed as positive because it is in 
concert with the wishes of elected and/or agency officials.  Furthermore, it is assumed 
to be democratic because elected officials represent the people.  When street-level 
workers “bend” the rules, they are engaging in shirking which is viewed in a negative 
light because they are circumventing the wishes of their superiors.  Lastly, when 
street-level employees “break” the rules, they are sabotaging agency policy and 
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producing a negative work output which is more than just shirking.  Brehm and Gates 
make another normative judgment in this instance.  They judge negative outputs to be 
the most destructive to a representative democracy because not only do they subvert 
the wishes of the elected representatives, they waste valuable resources that could be 
used to further their goals (Brehm and Gates 1997).   
 While Brehm and Gates’ basic premise, that street-level workers do more than 
shirk and that decisions originate from several contextual factors may be correct, their 
framework is largely incomplete and reflects poorly on street-level workers.  The 
enhanced principal agency model does not account for all the possibilities of street-
level decision-making.  Street-level workers may produce both positive and negative 
work outputs independent of whether they are working, shirking, or sabotaging agency 
rules (Leland and Maynard-Moody 1998).   
  Others have gone further in explaining inspector behavior.  Specifically, 
Michael Lipsky’s seminal work in Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980) explored several 
of the questions posited above.  Lipsky argued that workers such as police officers, 
social-service workers, and the like, must exercise discretion for several reasons.  
First, discretion is required to apply rules in specific cases because “street-level 
bureaucrats often work in situations too complicated to be reduced to programmatic 
formats” (Lipsky 1980, 15).  Second, Lipsky suggested that some situations require 
public employees to make judgments about people:  “Street-level bureaucrats work in 
situations that often require responses to human dimensions of situations” (Lipsky 
1980, 15).  Third, because “street-level discretion promotes workers’ self-regard and 
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encourages clients to believe that workers hold the key to their well-being,” the 
practice of discretion is reinforced (Lipsky 1980, 15).  In other words, workers need to 
feel they can make the decisions that are necessary for them to perform their jobs.  
Finally, Lipsky (1980) noted that some public employees operate largely independent 
of direct supervision as they carry out their tasks.  A supervisor cannot physically be 
present nor be called to the scene to oversee all decisions.  While Lipsky’s 
conceptualization of the inevitability of discretion is descriptively accurate, there still 
continues to be various theories advanced that either further his basic principles or are 
in total contrast to his original ideas.  
 Given the discretion that is exercised by street-level bureaucrats, public 
employees have become the ultimate implementers of public policy (Lipsky 1980; 
Vinzant and Crothers 1998; Frederickson 1986).  Working for public agencies, their 
jobs involve decisions on a daily basis that have the potential to shape policy 
outcomes.  The term “street-level bureaucrat” was first used by Lipsky (1980), and it 
is used interchangeably throughout this text with local-level and also line-level 
personnel.  Street-level bureaucrats have been described as workers that meet face-to-
face with clients in everyday work situations.  These street-level workers have become 
key actors in the policy process through their ability to exercise discretion when 
servicing clients.   
 Scholars also have argued that discretion at any level of bureaucratic work is 
nearly impossible to avoid (Lipsky 1980; Vinzant and Crothers 1998).  The primary 
argument posited by many scholars is that discretion cannot be eliminated from street-
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level work because the work environment involves complex tasks for which it is 
impossible to prescribe rules, guidelines, and instructions to cover all possible 
contingencies.  Indeed, it has been shown that street-level workers operate in less than 
ideal circumstances (Lipsky 1980; Vinzant and Crothers 1998).  Street-level workers 
are faced with unforeseen problems and situations that are multifaceted, intractable, 
and politically and emotionally charged.  Regulatory inspectors serve as a good 
example since they do not carry around an instruction manual on what, when, and how 
to intervene with the regulated industry.  It would be difficult to develop such a 
manual because it would prove difficult to list all of the possible scenarios.  Moreover, 
inspectors are often confronted with conflicting and vague information.  Agency rules 
are often conflicting and nebulous because of numerous principals that cannot agree 
on the means for implementing a particular policy.  It has even been suggested that 
inspectors are forced to exercise discretion because the principals writing the rules 
leave them vague in order to compromise, avoid conflict and leave the decisions up to 
those who carry them out (Leland 1999).   
 Street-level workers are forced to make decisions while, at the same time, 
balancing the principles of accountability, equity, and effectiveness.  Furthermore, the 
difficulty of these decisions is compounded by the need to keep citizens, clients, 
elected officials, and management happy.  At this point in time, we know little about 
the decision-making processes of street-level workers.  This study furthers knowledge 
about street-level decision-making by offering insights from street-level worker 
perspectives.   
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 In idealized images of the rule of law, public administrators apply universal 
policies to all citizens in a consistent and neutral fashion.  Many contemporary 
accounts of bureaucracy, however, bear little resemblance to this image.  Discretion 
has come to be recognized as an inescapable feature of public life (Hawkins 1992), 
and students of bureaucracy now tend to agree that administrators exercise a 
considerable amount of choice in policy implementation (Lipsky 1980; Meier 1993; 
Kerwin 1994).  As noted earlier, some scholars now point to a positive role for 
discretion, arguing that bureaucrats use it primarily to respond to clients’ special 
needs, to pursue more equitable outcomes, and to allocate resources where they are 
most needed (Jones 1978; Goodsell 1981).   
 As noted earlier, discretion to some scholars signals the potential for abuses of 
authority.  Due to a variety of material, legal, and social factors, administrators tend to 
hold significant power over their clients  (Handler 1992).  According to Keiser and 
Soss (1998, 3-5) the exercise of discretion has typically raised two types of concerns 
for scholars.  First, administrators may use their discretion to limit access to policy 
benefits and authoritative processes--a “less visible mode of fiscal retrenchment” that 
Michael Lipsky (1980) terms “bureaucratic disentitlement.”  Second, because 
administrative decisions may be influenced by moral or political judgments, discretion 
may be used in ways that harm or discriminate against specific categories of clients 
(Prottas 1979; Lipsky 1980; Hasenfeld 1987).   
 These general problems of discretion give rise to additional concerns when 
responsibility for implementing policy is parceled out to the fifty states or when 
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responsibility for a state policy is given to county or city governments.  In these cases, 
local bureaucratic discretion may work to undermine the goals of legislators at a 
higher level of government.  In addition, if the factors that shape administrative choice 
vary across locales, then citizens in some places may have access to benefits that are 
denied to their neighbors in other political jurisdictions. 
 For these and other reasons, students of public policy have increasingly pointed to 
the need for general theories of administrative behavior that can explain variation in 
the use of discretion.  The importance of developing explanations for the use of 
discretion in intergovernmental programs has become even more apparent in light of 
recent movement toward federal government devolution of power (Handler 1995; 
Sawhill 1995). 
 Compliance.  Compliance and the enforcement patterns used in attempts to 
achieve it have been major themes in research on regulation, particularly that now-
substantial body of work that has been concerned with health and safety, 
environmental pollution, and the regulation of industrial processes (Clarke 2002).  
Although there are important variations, these share significant features:  the 
regulation of largely material hazards by substantial agencies with relatively long 
traditions, addressing problems which, though they change as industries develop, also 
involve well established hazards.  Agencies and their inspectors hence face the 
difficulties of keeping all their regulatees up to standards and researchers have focused 
on how this can be achieved over time with regulators who present a wide variety of 
different faces:  (e.g., cooperative, antagonistic, recalcitrant, incompetent.)  Most of 
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these studies address “normal regulation,” that is established regulation, investigating 
in considerable empirical detail how agencies achieve what they achieve.  The 
achievement may or may not be substantial compliance, what techniques are 
employed, and what constraints limit them. 
 Compliance therefore refers to several different features of the regulator/regulatee 
relationship.  Most evidently, it involves the agency getting the regulatee to do what is 
asked, to comply, but this immediately raises a catalog of issues that are at the heart of 
this literature concerning what the inspector believes is reasonable to ask for in the 
light, not only of his/her powers and resources (notably time) and of established law, 
regulation and standards, but also of his understanding of the capacity and willingness 
of the regulatee to comply.  And when the demand is made, perhaps after a formal 
periodic announced or unannounced, inspection, how is the regulatee supposed to 
achieve compliance?  This raises a second meaning of the term.  After an inspection 
the inspector(s) will identify what they want done for the regulated entity—a factory, a 
nursing home—to come into a state of compliance.  This may involve very little in 
terms of numbers and significance of items, or it may involve many items and include 
major undertakings involving time and money for the regulatee.  The inspector hence 
has to decide how to pitch what practical compliance means. 
 One popular belief is that compliance, with development management regulation, 
fails when local governments lack the capacity to compel compliance by finding 
violations and by demanding that they be corrected (Burby  1998).  Slowly, these 
beliefs have evolved to consider another perspective.  From this latter perspective, it is 
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believed the key to creating compliance lies not so much in detecting and correcting 
violations as in creating conditions under which violations are less likely to occur and 
need correction (Burby  1998; Bardach and Kagan 1982; Kagan 1994; Scholz 1994).  
Thus, in developing enforcement plans, regulatory administrators are forced to decide 
which of these two perspectives to emphasize. 
 To emphasize enforced compliance, administrators would need to concentrate on 
increasing the enforcement capacity by adding more and better trained personnel and 
by expending more effort on various enforcement tasks.  Some of the tasks of enforced 
compliance that have been examined are:  surveillance to detect development without 
a permit and review of development and building plans (Kelly 1998; O’Bannon 1989; 
Schilling and Hare 1994).   
 Placing an emphasis on fostering voluntary commitment would involve efforts to 
communicate with regulated firms and with individuals to make sure they understand 
what the law requires.  Some of the activities that have been proposed include:  
negotiating with contractors to persuade them to comply (Ahlbrandt 1976; Kagan 
1994; Scholz 1994). 
 Receiving a definitive answer from regulatory experts about the most appropriate 
approach to fostering voluntary compliance from regulated entities is difficult.  
Indeed, regulatory experts cannot reach a consensus concerning the most appropriate 
approach.  One faction advocates careful monitoring of compliance, uniform and strict 
application of code and permit requirements, and sanctions such as stop work orders 
and fines to deter violations.  This is an approach that Burby  (1998) have termed 
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“systematic”.  A second faction argues for relaxing requirements when the goals of 
regulations will not be compromised and for when relaxed requirements and 
incentives are used to foster good working relationships with firms which will then 
comply in order to maintain favorable treatment by enforcement personnel.  This is a 
term that Burby  (1998) refer to as “facilitative.”   To be sure, credible arguments have 
been made for both approaches.  However, at this point, there has been little evidence 
about which is most effective in enhancing the commitment to comply voluntarily 
with regulatory requirements.   
 In this context of a diverse policy system, it is not enough to recognize that 
discretion during implementation affects policy outcomes.  Students of public policy 
require empirically grounded theories that can explain inspectors’ exercise discretion, 
and that can explain why discretion in the administrative process produces particular 
outcomes in some circumstances but not in others.  In what follows, I provide 
evidence that some forces that influence inspector discretion come from inside the 
bureaucracy while others flow from external factors and the environment of particular 
agencies.  Furthermore, I also provide evidence that compliance with regulations is 
tied to a number of factors including those internal and external to the agency and 
inspectors’ environment.     
 My analysis builds on two traditions of theory that suggest different reasons why 
the use of discretion may vary systematically among inspectors.  The first tradition 
argues that administrative choices will be shaped by the internal characteristics of 
public agencies, characteristics such as resources and bureaucratic values.  The second 
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tradition emphasizes external factors, asserting that a bureaucracy’s political and task 
environments will shape the use of discretion.   
 As highlighted above, it has been recognized widely that the problems and 
challenges faced in building code regulation are neglected in studies of regulation.  
However, it is posited here that they are illustrative of the more general issues of local 
regulatory enforcement.  It has been noted that there are notable compliance problems 
in a number of regulatory policy areas (Burby  1998).  To explain shortfalls in 
regulatory compliance, this research examines some of the traditional factors that have 
been posited to exert influence on compliance.  Included in this examination are the 
possibilities that the challenges in bringing about compliance arise from the lack of 
cohesion between agencies and inspectors, the severe limitations on resources in most 
code enforcement agencies, the enforcement approaches chosen by agencies, and the 
regulatory and political environments in which inspectors and agencies operate.   
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Chapter 3:  Data, Methods and Measurement 
When thinking about issues of regulatory policies, many people consider 
highly salient issues like facilities for housing criminals, environmental degradation, 
and insurance requirements.  These issues receive a lot of consideration because they 
generate media attention, especially when there is a policy problem, crisis, or scandal.  
However, for many regulatory issues it is hard to generate media attention and to 
occupy a prominent place in the minds of citizens.  Public safety regulated by 
enforcement of building codes is one such policy area.    
Hypotheses and Expectations 
Discretion.  As noted above, two general theories of bureaucratic action 
provide a starting point for analyzing patterns of inspector discretion.  The first argues 
that the uses of bureaucratic discretion will be driven by internal characteristics of the 
bureaucracy.  According to Ripley (1995) “internal” refers to the inside of government 
in both a structural sense and a process sense.  The government has a particular 
structure and a particular set of processes at any given time.  These facts have general 
policy consequences, as does the pattern of relationships between governmental units 
and nongovernmental interests.   
The second places greater emphasis on external or environmental 
characteristics of the bureaucracy.  The idea of operating in different “task” and 
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“political” environments is fully developed by Kagan (1994).  This external 
perspective treats inspectors as fungible actors responding to outside stimuli.  In 
addition to internal characteristics, scholars have noted that a variety of environmental 
factors shape administrative behavior.  According to open systems theory, 
bureaucratic survival and effectiveness depend on external legitimacy.  As a result, the 
environments in which they exist influence bureaucracies, and, they seek to 
manipulate those environments (Thompson 1967; Meier 1993).  Lastly, this study 
controls for several local situational factors that may influence the exercise of 
inspector discretion.   
 Essentially, two sets of hypotheses are central to the research.  One concerns the 
role of internal influences (e.g., job satisfaction, experience, agency resources) in 
shaping the use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats.  The second concerns the role 
of external or environmental factors (e.g., political pressure, corruption) in affecting 
the behavior of line-level personnel.   
There is considerable evidence to suggest that individual street-level 
bureaucrats vary in how they carry out rules and procedures.  It has been suggested 
that administrators may fail to implement that agency’s rules because they do not 
know about them (Prottas 1979; Brehm and Hamilton 1996).  When confronted with 
significant time constraints and an excess of rules and procedures, bureaucrats also 
tend to pick and choose among the rules of an agency (Lipsky 1980, 1984).    For all 
these reasons, it seems likely that inspectors will vary considerably in their adherence 
to agency policies.  
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The analysis of inspector discretion focuses on three broad-based assumptions:  
(1) inspectors will differ greatly in the exercise of discretion; (2) both internal and 
external factors will play an integral role in the exercise of inspector discretion; and, 
(3) internal factors will be more influential than external factors in shaping the 
exercise of inspector discretion.   
  Internal Factors.  Internal conditions will be the most important factors in 
influencing the exercise of street-level discretion.  The causal logic is that the choice 
to exercise discretion is most heavily influenced by factors that are internal to 
inspectors’ environments.  There are several internal factors that have the potential to 
influence inspector behavior, and each is discussed briefly below. 
To begin with, standardization of inspector behavior has the potential to 
influence inspector behavior.  Agencies have attempted to counteract local influences 
with numerous techniques and strategies, most of which include procedures for 
controlling and “pre-forming” decisions, detecting and discouraging deviation, and 
developing the will and capacity of field officers to conform to central guideline 
(Kaufman 1960).  Agencies have the ability to shape implementation procedures 
through standardization of inspector behavior.  Standardization can be achieved in a 
number of ways such as inspection checklists, performance reviews, and training.  The 
analysis below addresses oversight and flexibility and the influence of each upon 
inspector discretion.  The specific hypotheses regarding internal factors are as follows: 
 
  H1: Inspectors employed at agencies with standardized procedures for   
  overseeing inspector behavior will exercise less discretion.   
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Also concerned with bureaucratic responsiveness to internal factors, is the idea 
that an agency’s enforcement strategy has the ability to shape individual inspector 
behavior.  The notion of agency flexibility is primarily concerned with what officials 
do once they have decided that the actions of the regulated enterprise constitute 
“violations.”  As noted by Kagan (1994), many regulatory agencies claim that they 
strive for an intermediate or “flexible” style of rule interpretation and enforcement:  
legalistic and tough in some cases, accommodative and helpful in others, depending 
on the reliability of the particular regulated enterprise and the seriousness of risk at 
hand.   
 H2:  Inspectors working for agencies advocating a flexible approach to   
  enforcement will be more likely to exercise discretion in the enforcement  
  of regulations. 
Further explaining internal factors is the idea that agency leadership will influence the 
exercise of inspector discretion.  It is shortsighted to suppose that “external” 
explanatory factors (the agency’s legal mission and powers, its task environment, and 
its political environment) completely determine agency behavior.    Within this space, 
inspector discretion has the potential to be influenced by administrative leadership.  It 
is possible through communication and support for top officials to have their policies 
translated into desired day-to-day decisions of street-level workers.  This leadership 
has the ability to provide support, encouragement, and, possibly more importantly, 
technical expertise in the implementation of building codes.  The particular hypotheses 
to be tested here is:  
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  H3:  Strong agency leadership will limit the discretion that inspectors   
  exercise.  
 
In addition to being responsive to principals, scholars studying bureaucracy 
also have recognized that resources play a major role in shaping administrative 
performance (Sabatier 1988; Barrileaux, Feiock and Crew 1992; Sigelman 1984).  
This is true for many bureaucracies because they tend to have inadequate resources to 
meet the demands placed on them.  Scarcity pushes administrators and bureaucrats 
into a variety of strategies for conserving and rationing limited resources (Lipsky 
1980).  Among the limited resources of street-level inspectors are money and technical 
information or expertise.  Resources necessary to function adequately must be 
provided.  If an adequate budget is not provided to engage in such things as inspection 
and prosecution, then inspectors are forced to develop coping mechanisms to function 
and achieve some degree of compliance--the ultimate goal of the agency and most 
inspectors.  Thus, inspectors with few monetary resources often are not able to 
implement the policies by the book as intended.  Instead, they exercise discretion in 
their daily functions.   Or, the inspectors may choose to shirk, engaging in yet another 
form of discretion.  The underlying hypotheses are as follows:  
H4:  As budget adequacy increases, the likelihood of inspectors    
  exercising discretion will decrease 
 
  H5:   As technical expertise of agencies increases, the likelihood of   
  inspectors exercising discretion will decrease. 
  
 Moreover, it is possible that several personal factors internal to the inspector’s 
environment, factors such as job satisfaction and experience, have the potential to 
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influence inspector behavior.  Research on employee attitudes toward their work 
organizations has yielded a variety of labels (Romzek and Hendricks 1982).  In 
particular, the concepts of satisfaction, commitment, and involvement are widely used.  
Job satisfaction provides organizations with employees who are committed to agency 
objectives.  Romzek and Hendricks (1982) have found that satisfied employees are 
likely to be loyal to the organization and to be conscious of the organizations’ 
expectations for involvement.  Thus it is expected that: 
H6:       Job satisfaction will limit the amount of discretion that inspectors  
       exercise. 
  
Gormley (1996) also has written extensively on the prospect for experience to 
affect inspector attitudes and behavior.  It has been suggested that more recently hired 
staff members may be more inclined to go by the book (exercise less discretion) either 
to impress their superiors or because they do not trust their own judgment.  
Furthermore, Hedge  (1988) in a study of mine safety regulation found, that more 
experienced inspectors wrote fewer tickets (or notices of violation), suggesting that 
more experienced inspectors practice a more flexible approach.  The expectation here 
is: 
H7:      Inspector experience will increase the amount of discretion that  
      inspectors exercise.   
  
Political pressure has the ability to shape inspector behavior because regulation 
is a political process.  Kagan (1994, 399) notes that “regulation often reflects the 
views of the winners in a political debate over how stringent an agency’s legal mission 
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should be stated, the powers it will have, the discretion administrators will be 
granted.”   Policy implementation often reflects the political environments in which 
bureaucracies operate (Downs 1967).  External political institutions create 
bureaucracies and retain control over the terms and duration of a bureaucracy’s 
existence (Meier 1993).  Partly because of this dependency, formal political principals 
tend to exert some influence on the behavior of bureaucrats (Barrileaux and Miller 
1988; Wood and Waterman 1994; Ringquist 1995; Scholz and Wei 1986).  The 
assumption is:  
  H8:   When local elected officials become involved in inspector decisions  
  regarding enforcement decisions those inspectors will adopt a   
  more legalistic style, exercising less discretion.   
 
In addition to political pressure, inspectors have the potential to be influenced 
by incidences of scandal or corruption.  Kagan (1994) has suggested that scandals or 
corruption have the ability to influence inspector behavior.  Political leaders often 
respond by holding hearings, replacing agency heads, and calling for new, more 
rigorously enforced regulations.  A recent scandal is a reasonably good predictor of a 
more zealous, legalistic enforcement style, at least for a while.  Scandals, including 
revelations of unpublished violations or regulatory incompetence, can have the same 
effect (Bardach and Kagan, 1982:  ch.7).  The underlying assumption is as follows:  
 H9: Building departments that have experienced  incidents of    
  corruption or scandal recently will restrict the discretionary   
  powers of inspectors. 
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External Factors.  External factors will shape the exercise of inspector 
discretion, but, these factors will not exert the same level of influence as internal 
factors.  Following the line of argument developed by Kagan (1994), the logic is that 
the environment often sends mixed or conflicting signals, giving agency 
administrators several degrees of freedom (Kagan 1994).  Given this lack of 
unification, it is unlikely that these factors will have the same effect that internal 
factors do in shaping inspector behavior.     
Interest groups also exert influence on inspector behavior.  There is 
considerable evidence to suggest that citizens and citizens’ groups have been able to 
shape the behavior of a wide variety of administrative agencies with regulatory 
responsibilities (Rosener 1982; Godschalk and Stiftel 1981; Rosenbaum 1983).  
Previous research (primarily concerned with rail and air transportation) resulted in the 
formulation of “capture theory.”  According to Kagan (1994) the idea was that 
repeated contact with representatives of a single industry, one intensely interested in 
regulatory policy and appointments, would draw regulatory officials toward an 
“industry orientation” by which their view of the public interest coincided with that of 
the dominant firms in the regulated industry.  A basic feature of those industry-
stabilizing regulatory programs was that politically unorganized consumer interests 
rarely exerted pressure on the agency, counteracting industry influence. 
Some scholars argue that capture theory has collapsed as a general proposition 
(Quirk, 1981; Wilson, 1980).  Even in economic regulation, increasing political 
participation by representatives of consumer groups often has pressured agencies to 
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enact stringent policies, overriding industry objectives (Anderson, 1981).  According 
to Kagan (1994), in many protective regulatory programs, organizations advocating 
stringent regulation actively monitor compliance and participate in rule-making and 
enforcement proceedings.  In addition, Wilson (1989) has found that interest groups 
often influence the selection of agency personnel.  The underlying assumption is: 
H10: When interest group advocacy for strong enforcement of  building code 
provisions is exerted on street-level inspectors they will be less likely to 
exercise discretion when dealing with the regulated industry.   
 
  Furthermore, local situational factors have the ability to influence inspector 
actions.  Essentially, the variables population and construction of new homes are being 
used as proxies for economic conditions and for the capacity of cities and counties to 
adopt and implement building codes.  As previous studies have indicated, measures of 
growth can serve as a good indicator of the degree of professionalization of staff for 
which larger cities have more specialized functions (May and Burby 1994; May and 
Feeley 1994).  According to May and Feeley (1999), growth can have counter-acting 
effects.  On the one hand, increased growth creates a demand for regulatory controls, 
and it provides resources because building departments are typically funded from fees 
for building permits.  On the other hand, the resources often do not keep up with the 
demand thereby straining agency capacity to implement regulations.  The expectations 
are: 
H11:   As population density increases, the amount of inspector discretion  
  will decrease.  
  H12:   As new home construction increases, the amount of  inspector   
  discretion will decrease.   
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Now, I turn to the second primary focus of this research, regulatory compliance.   
Regulatory Compliance.  Essentially all regulatory agencies are faced with the 
fundamental tasks of monitoring regulations and pursuing compliance.  There are 
several reasons to examine regulatory compliance, with the primary reason being that 
shortfalls in regulatory enforcement are often cited as obstacles in preventing illness, 
loss of life, and even loss of property in natural disasters.  As noted by Burby  (1998), 
it is often assumed that once regulations are enacted, they are largely followed.  That 
presumption, however, turns out to be unwarranted.  Due to lack of attention, gaps in 
compliance go largely unnoticed even by professionals.  Moreover, there continues to 
be much disagreement among public policy scholars about what should be done to 
rectify this situation and to improve enforcement programs.  Viable solutions for how 
to enhance compliance have been few and far between for regulatory officials as well 
as for regulatory scholars.  In this study, references to compliance are concerned with 
industry adherence to regulations.  This study is operating under the assumption that 
compliance can be conceptualized as a matter of degree rather than a simple 
distinction between compliance and non-compliance (Coombs 1980; DiMento 1986; 
Kagan 1994).  What follows are several hypotheses related to regulatory compliance. 
Like Burby  (1998), to examine the implications of the choices that planning 
and other administrators face in crafting enforcement programs, data were gathered on 
enforcement and compliance with building codes from a national sample of city and 
county code enforcement officials.  For each jurisdiction in the sample, measures of 
the overall degree of compliance were developed.  Furthermore, information also was 
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obtained about the code enforcement agency’s capacity to detect and correct violations 
and about its actions taken to foster voluntary compliance. 
Much like the theoretical underpinnings guiding the examination of discretion, 
this research also is informed by two schools of thought regarding the factors that 
shape regulatory compliance.  The first places heavy emphasis on the internal 
characteristics (e.g., enforcement approaches) of agencies and their potential to affect 
regulatory compliance.  The second focuses on those things that are external (e.g,. 
politics) to an agency’s environment and on the potential of these factors to influence 
regulatory compliance. 
The analysis of regulatory compliance focuses on three broad-based 
assumptions:  (1) there will be great variance in the levels of compliance from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction; (2) both internal and external factors will play an integral 
role in regulatory compliance; and, (3) internal factors will be more influential than 
external factors in exerting pressure to comply with regulations. 
Enforcement Styles.  The extant literature dealing with industry compliance has 
focused on the variance of regulatory enforcement styles (Kagan 1994; Burby 1994; 
May and Burby 1998; May and Winter 1999) and their ability to achieve industry 
compliance.  Over time a number of qualitative distinctions have been made 
concerning different aspects of regulatory enforcement.  The dominant distinction has 
been between what is labeled as by-the-book enforcement entailing a legalistic 
approach and what is labeled as cooperative enforcement involving a flexible 
approach (for various descriptions, see Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Bardach and 
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Kagan 1982).  For purposes of this study, I distinguish the behavior of inspectors from 
the choices of regulatory agencies.  The behavior of inspectors is considered an 
enforcement style, and the agency-level choices are considered an overall enforcement 
strategy.  In concert, these various strategies seek to bring about compliance with 
regulations.   
Enforcement style has been discussed infinitum in the regulatory enforcement 
literature.    To be sure, regulatory agencies also make choices that are important 
components of regulatory enforcement.  There is a lot of disagreement over the most 
appropriate choices for fostering compliance by regulated entities.  One camp argues 
for the close monitoring of compliance, for uniform and strict application of code and 
permit requirements, and for the use of sanctions such as stop work orders and fines to 
deter violations.  The second group of scholars argues for relaxing requirements when 
the goals of regulations will not be compromised and for using this and other 
incentives to foster good working relationships with firms which will then comply in 
order to maintain favorable treatment by enforcement personnel.  Both sides have 
presented viable arguments for both approaches.  However, there has been little 
empirical evidence to tilt the balance in favor of one approach over the other in 
enhancing the commitment of regulated entities to comply.  The data allow me to test 
the viability of a number of agency enforcement approaches in bringing about 
regulatory compliance.   
H13:   Flexible enforcement approaches will increase levels of   
   compliance. 
H14:   Enforcement approaches emphasizing incentives will enhance the  
   effectiveness of enforcement. 
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H15:   Agencies promoting standardized fieldwork approaches to   
   enforcement will promote greater regulatory compliance. 
H16:   Coercive enforcement approaches will not be effective in   
   enhancing compliance from regulated entities. 
 
Discretion/Cohesion.  In addition to enforcement styles this study also 
examines the role of inspector discretion and cohesion.  In this study enforcement 
style is simply the degree of discretion that inspectors exercise in their day-to-day 
interactions with the regulated industry.  This is a simplistic, yet unfettered, 
conceptualization of style.   
Much of the literature dealing with policy congruence (agreement of agencies 
and inspectors on objectives to be pursued) and with the need for cohesion to achieve 
industry compliance has been case study in nature (Miller 1992; Bianco and Bates 
1989).   Is policy congruence important for achieving industry compliance or are 
agency enforcement approaches, capacity for enforced compliance, and environmental 
variables or situational factors more important in obtaining industry compliance?  This 
question also has important theoretical and practical implications, but little systematic 
evidence exists to confirm the fact that policy congruence is important in obtaining 
industry compliance.  Intuitively, it makes sense that congruence would be important 
for compliance, but it has not been tested empirically. It is possible that congruence 
varies with the ability level of inspectors.  If inspectors are not skilled, congruence 
may be important; however, if inspectors are skilled, the use of discretion may 
produce better outcomes since rules cannot be applied to all situations.   
Several practical concerns are also to be addressed here.  If policy congruence 
is not important for obtaining industry compliance, then there is little reason for 
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building departments/agencies to limit the discretion of their inspectors.  It is posited 
that this should be viewed as an optimistic expectation.  Since discretion is inherent in 
the job of most street-level bureaucrats, it would indicate that the exercise of 
discretion has not hindered industry compliance with regulatory rules.  Furthermore, 
this finding would confirm previous research findings that enforcement styles and 
environmental variables are more important in explaining industry compliance, and it 
can lead to some systematic evidence concerning the study of regulatory policy.  
Conversely, if policy congruence is important for obtaining compliance from the 
regulated industry, then there is reason for agencies to pursue congruence from the 
inspectors they employ. This is not to say that the exercise of inspector discretion 
guarantees noncompliance from the regulated industry.  To the contrary, several 
regulatory theorists have posited that cooperative enforcement that requires inspectors 
to exercise discretion will lead to more compliance (Scholz 1994; Kagan 1994).  
Under this scenario, agency policy emphasizes use of discretion by inspectors, thus 
allowing inspectors to be flexible while at the same time maintaining congruence with 
agency directives. 
 H17:   Inspectors exercising greater degrees of discretion will be more   
  effective in achieving regulatory compliance. 
 
Agency Capacity.  Agency capacity (e.g., budgets) for enforced compliance  
refers to the resources that are devoted to dealing with regulatory compliance.  One 
means of assessing capacity is the financial resources of a government unit.  Indeed, 
high government spending has been shown to reduce levels of water pollution 
     
65
(Ringquist 1993) and other environmental problems at the state level (Lester and 
Lombard 1990).  This analysis provides an opportunity to test several types of agency 
resources and their effects on regulatory compliance. 
H18:   Agencies possessing greater levels of resources will attain higher  
   levels of regulatory compliance. 
  
 While it may seem that Hypothesis 17 is inconsistent with Hypotheses 4 and 18, it 
is not the case.  The purpose here is to provide more insight into various approaches 
that foster regulatory compliance by testing two competing theories regarding the most 
effective means for obtaining compliance from regulated industries.  The hypotheses 
are both stated in positive terms given that scholars on both sides of the debate have 
provided evidence supporting their various contentions regarding methods for 
achieving compliance. 
Environmental Variables.  In examining compliance, I control statistically for 
several situational factors that can affect the efficacy of local enforcement efforts.  As 
with Burby  (1998), it has been suggested that local situational factors can be critical 
for compliance with regulations.  Particularly, this study controls for the political 
environment of the local government within which enforcement decisions are made, 
the degree of corruption, and the size and rate of growth of the community.  It has 
been suggested that enforcement decisions that are highly political send mixed signals 
to the regulated.  This, in combination with smaller and slower growing communities, 
fosters a political climate that is likely to resist strong enforcement (Burby , 1998).   
H19:   Those areas with greater interest group involvement will have  
   higher level of compliance.   
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H20:   Those areas with a more politicized task environment will have  
   lower degrees of compliance. 
H21:   Those areas with slower growth and smaller populations will  
   experience lower degrees of compliance. 
 
 The preceding discussion has served to highlight scholarly thinking and past 
empirical research on inspector discretion in enforcing industry compliance with 
regulatory policies.  In addition, it has cast some light on many of the normative 
disputes regarding the role of inspector discretion in implementation and in the most 
effective means for obtaining regulatory compliance.  It is important to examine this 
past scholarly thinking to inform our theories and expectations regarding the potential 
factors that influence inspector discretion and industry compliance.  The following 
chapter will further refine the arguments for the expected relationships between the 
various factors and give detailed information about the data sources and measurement 
of the various concepts.   
Data and Sample Origin 
 To examine the implementation of building codes, I utilize data on enforcement 
of and compliance with building codes from two national surveys.  The survey data for 
this dissertation are the product of two complimentary mail surveys conducted during 
the summers of 1995 and 1996 respectively.  The first conducted by Burby, May and 
Patterson (1998), surveyed local building officials throughout the United States for 
their opinions and practices toward code enforcement issues in their jurisdictions and 
the degrees of compliance they believed they obtained from regulated entities.  The 
first survey of local building code administration is a national sample of local building 
departments and county code enforcement officials.  The first sample frame was 
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constructed by the National Conference of States and Building Codes (1992) for a 
study conducted for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  It consisted of 
1,350 local governments selected in a complex, multistage sampling procedure 
weighted on the basis of population and seismic risk.  By eliminating the over-sample 
of earthquake-prone areas, the size of the sample frame was reduced to 990 cities and 
counties.  The sample frame was updated in the spring of 1995 through a telephone 
survey conducted to obtain the names of local officials responsible for building code 
enforcement and their correct mailing addresses.  The national survey consisted of an 
initial mailing and three follow-up mailings during the summer of 1995.  Responses 
were obtained from 819 governments (an 83 percent response rate).  The resulting data 
provide a highly accurate, nationally representative picture of code enforcement in 
local governments.  
 The results of this survey provide the sample frame for a second data collection 
effort by Jose Cabral, a research fellow at the University of New Orleans, in the 
following year.  From the 819 responses, weighted to be representative of building 
departments nationally, 200 were selected randomly and asked to participate in a 
second survey.  Of these, 121 responded positively to the request.  Building inspectors 
in each of the cities were surveyed for the specifics of everyday inspection practices as 
well as more general questions about their attitudes toward code enforcement.  The 
construction of the second sample frame began in the Fall of 1994 with the objective 
of observing the enforcement strategy applied in the field by inspectors for purposes of 
categorization of and gathering the opinions of inspectors and administrators about the 
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factors that affect enforcement strategies.  To this end, participant observation, 
specifically the technique of “the complete observer,” and open-ended, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with building inspectors and administrators.   
 After the interviews the sample population was chosen.  The study population is 
composed of building inspectors in the United States.  The selection of the sample 
presented a challenge given the large number of building departments in the United 
States (about 40,000 local jurisdictions) and the potential number of inspectors that 
would conform to the sampling frame.  The sample frame was chosen from the 
original 819 local building departments discussed above.  Two hundred jurisdictions 
were randomly selected from the database, and officials from each of these 
departments were contacted concerning the willingness to administer the survey to 
inspectors in their respective departments.  Of the 200 departments contacted through 
three separate mailings, 121 responded positively.  Sixty nine building departments 
participated in the survey (for a response rate of 57%).  A total of 287 inspectors 
participated in the survey.   
Methodology and Measurement 
To test my hypotheses, and focus on the building agency as the unit of 
analysis, inspector data were averaged to come up with agency inspector variable 
scores.  I utilize Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) models of inspector 
discretion in the implementation of building codes and contractor compliance with 
building codes in the United States for 1995.  I use the models to explain variation in 
the exercise of inspector discretion and industry compliance with building codes.  
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Moreover, OLS allows me to empirically examine factors that influence discretion, 
going much further than the traditional normative practice of discussing the positives 
and negatives of exercising discretion.  This analysis has the potential to give more 
than just a cursory view of the behaviors in which street-level bureaucrats engage.  
Furthermore, the initial analysis contributes directly to the subsequent analysis of 
industry compliance.  The measurement and analysis of discretion will provide and 
empirical answer to the oft-asked normative question: Is discretion good or bad?  By 
including discretion in a statistical model that examines compliance with the building 
code, I am also able to arrive at a more reliable answer to the discretion question that 
is often the topic of normative discussions regarding bureaucratic behavior. 
 In what follows, is a detailed discussion of the variables that comprise the two 
models.  While some of the variables are the same in the two models, they will be 
listed twice for purposes of clarification. 
Dependent Variable-Model 1: Discretion 
    Inspector discretion is composed of a 7-item scale regarding inspector’s actions 
in differing field enforcement situations, with higher scores on the scale indicating 
greater use of discretion.  The items are concerned with whether inspectors range from 
strongly disagreeing to strongly agreeing with various statements regarding the use of 
discretion in field enforcement situations.  This seven-item additive scale has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .79 (see Appendix A for all descriptive statistics regarding this 
measure of discretion and all subsequent variables employed in each of the models), 
indicating the robust reliability of this measure.   
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However, it is not only the statistical reliability of this scale that gives one 
confidence that the concept of discretion is properly measured.  The questions in the 
survey cover a variety of real enforcement situations in which the inspector has the 
choice to exercise or refrain from using discretion.  For example, inspectors are asked 
to respond to the following:  “The provisions of the Building Code are too complex 
and numerous; as a result I enforce mainly those that I consider are most effective in 
protecting life safety” (see Appendix B for exact question wording regarding all items 
in the additive scale and all other variables employed in both models).  Given the 
above question, it is quite obvious that this battery of questions properly measures the 
concept of discretion.  In addition, these questions fit well with how the concept of 
discretion has been defined in various texts as were noted earlier in Chapter 2.  These 
questions do measure whether inspectors have “the power of free decision or latitude 
of choice.”  In addition, these questions measure whether street-level bureaucrats 
“adapt to local situations.”   
Independent Variables-Model 1 
 Standardization of Inspector Behavior.  This independent variable is measured 
with an eight-item additive scale.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is .66.  Higher 
scores on the additive scale indicate greater standardization of inspector behavior.  The 
various items consist of things such as the use of inspection checklists and forms, and 
annual performance evaluations.    
 Agency Leadership.  Essentially this variable is measuring inspectors’ perception 
of a particular agency’s leadership capabilities.  Like the two previous independent 
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variables, this measure also is an additive scale, and it is composed of twelve items 
that result in a Cronbach’s alpha of .88   Higher scores on this scale indicate 
stronger/better leadership from an agency. 
 Bureaucratic Resources.  Two measures of bureaucratic resources or capacity are 
utilized here.  The first concerns the perceived level of technical expertise of building 
agencies.   This measure ranges from 1 to 5 with a score of 1 indicating low levels of 
technical expertise and a score of 5 indicating high levels of technical expertise.  The 
second measure of bureaucratic resources concerns the perceived adequacy of the 
budget for the Building Department to perform its mission.  Like the first measure of 
bureaucratic resources, the adequacy of the budget is also measured on a 5-point scale 
with a score of 1 indicating an inadequate budget and a score of 5 indicating an 
adequate budget.   
 Job Satisfaction.  The concept of job satisfaction is measured with a 10-point 
scale.  On this 10 point scale inspectors are asked to rate their satisfaction with their 
job on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 indicating low satisfaction and 10 indicating high 
satisfaction.   
 Inspector Experience.  Like job satisfaction, inspector experience consists of one 
question.  Inspectors are simply asked to indicate the year in which they began 
working for the Building Department.  This is then subtracted from the year 1995 to 
indicate the number of years of experience for an inspector with higher scores 
indicating more experience.   
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 Enforcement Approaches.  Several enforcement approaches reported by building 
agencies are examined in the model.  The first, use of flexible enforcement tools, 
such as being able to relax standards based on extenuating circumstances, is composed 
of a six-item additive scale.  Each item in the scale is concerned with the degree of 
discretion that the particular agency allows inspectors to exercise in differing 
enforcement situations.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is .60.   Higher scores on 
the scale indicate greater allowances of agency flexibility for inspectors.   
 The fourth measure of agency approaches to enforcement also is an additive scale.  
The 3-item scale measures the use of fines over the last 12 months.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the scale is .64. 
 Politicization.  This independent variable from the first mail survey of 819 
jurisdictions is concerned with how often local elected officials become involved in 
Building Department decisions on building code cases.  The responses to this question 
may vary from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating elected officials never becoming involved and 
5 indicating the elected officials often become involved.   
 Interest Group Pressure.  This measure of political pressure is essentially an 
index of interest group advocacy regarding code enforcement.  The theoretical range 
of this variable is 0 to 12 with higher scores indicating greater advocacy for stronger 
code enforcement in this particular jurisdiction. 
 Scandal/Corruption.  This independent variable is concerned with incidences of 
corruption in the process of code enforcement during the past ten years.  The 
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responses to this question range from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating no incidences of 
corruption and 1 indicating at least one and incident of corruption.    
 Population Density.  This control variable is simply measured as resident 
population in thousands by state in 1995 with higher numbers indicating more dense 
populations. 
 Construction of New Homes.  This measure of growth is derived by calculating 
the percentage of housing units built during the previous ten-year period with higher 
scores indicating greater residential growth. 
Dependent Variable-Model 2: Compliance 
  The second dependent variable examined is industry compliance with the 
building code.  This variable is a measure of departmental evaluations of the 
effectiveness of the building code enforcement program.  The effectiveness of the 
program ranges from 1 to 10 with lower scores indicating lower degrees of compliance 
from the regulated industry and higher scores indicating higher levels of compliance 
from the regulated entity.  While it may seem troublesome to some to allow 
bureaucrats to evaluate themselves, the opposite has proven true; bureaucrats have not 
engaged in exaggerated self-assessments.  Inspectors in such programs as 
sedimentation control in North Carolina have proved to be quite objective and 
accurate in their self-assessments. 
Independent Variables-Model 2 
Enforcement Approaches.  Several enforcement approaches are examined in 
the model.  The first, use of flexible enforcement tools such as being able to relax 
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standards based on extenuating circumstances is composed of a six-item additive 
scale.  Each item in the scale is concerned with the degree of discretion that the 
particular agency allows inspectors to exercise in different enforcement situations.  
The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is .60.   Higher scores on the scale indicate greater 
allowances of agency flexibility for inspectors.   
 The second, use of various incentives to attain compliance, is a six-item 
additive scale composed of such items as less frequent inspections.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the scale is .50 with higher scores on the scale indicating greater utilization 
of incentives to attain compliance. 
 The fourth measure of agency approaches to enforcement also is an additive scale.  
The 3-item scale measures the use of fines over the last 12 months.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the scale is .64. 
 The fifth measure of enforcement approaches is concerned with the use of 
standard deterrent enforcement tools.  The 13-item scale is composed of such items 
as revocation of building permits.  The Cronbach’s alpha for this additive scale is .76. 
 The final measure of enforcement approaches taps the concept of the degree of 
standardization and supervision of the work of field inspectors.  This 9-item 
additive scale is comprised of such items as inspection checklists and forms.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is .68.   
 Discretion.  My measure of inspector discretion is composed of a 7-item scale 
(and it is the same measure employed as the dependent variable in the previous model) 
regarding inspector’s actions in differing field enforcement situations, with higher 
     
75
scores on the scale indicating greater use of discretion.  The items are concerned with 
whether inspectors range from strongly disagreeing to strongly agreeing with various 
statements regarding the use of discretion in field enforcement situations.  This seven-
item additive scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of .79  
 Agency Capacity.  The measure of perceived agency capacity is a 4-item scale 
composed of such items as the adequacy of staffing.  The additive scale has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .70. 
 Politicization.  This independent variable is concerned with how often local 
elected officials become involved in Building Department decisions on building code 
cases.  The responses to this question may vary from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating elected 
officials never becoming involved and 5 indicating the elected officials often become 
involved.   
 Interest Group Pressure.  This measure of political pressure is an index of interest 
group advocacy regarding code enforcement.  The theoretical range of this variable is 
0 to 12 with higher scores indicating greater advocacy for stronger code enforcement 
in this particular jurisdiction. 
 Scandal/Corruption.  This independent variable is concerned with incidences of 
corruption in the process of code enforcement during the past ten years.  The 
responses to this question range from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating no incidences of 
corruption and 1 indicating at least one incident of corruption.    
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 Population Density.  This control variable is simply measured as resident 
population in thousands by state in 1995 with higher numbers indicating more dense 
populations. 
 Construction of New Homes.  This measure of growth is derived by calculating 
the percentage of housing units built during the previous ten-year period with higher 
scores indicating greater residential growth. 
 In the preceding discussion, I have outlined the variables used in both models.  
Both of the models will be tested in the following two chapters.  Multivariate findings 
will be presented and a discussion of the findings from Model 1 will be offered in 
Chapter 4 and a presentation and discussion of the findings from Model 2 will be 
offered in Chapter 5.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
77
 
 
 
Chapter 4:  Inspector Discretion 
 The delegation of broad, policy making powers to regulatory inspectors has 
become one of the more important and interesting developments of contemporary 
American government.  The power has been given to these regulatory inspectors in the 
optimistic expectation that government will be able to accomplish an increasingly 
wide range of public purposes.  Some of the policies are pursued under broad statutory 
statements of general purpose that offer little more guidance than to serve the “public 
interest,” while other statutes give specific, detailed instructions to administrative 
agencies (Bryner 1987).   
 Regulatory programs concerned with safety regulation in particular, have been 
based on extremely ambitious goals to prevent harm and to bring under government 
monitoring to virtually all commercial and industrial activity.  These statutes promise 
dramatic improvement and even absolute achievement in reducing risks while 
providing little guidance about how the costs are to be distributed and how competing 
policy goals are to be achieved.  Regulatory power that was in the past usually limited 
to identifying prohibited practices in selected industries has mushroomed to include 
planning and directing industrial and commercial behavior and practices.  In nearly 
every case, the scope of agency responsibility and authority greatly exceeded the 
resources provided.  Congress regularly provides only a fraction of the resources 
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needed to accomplish the regulatory tasks delegated to regulatory agencies.  As a 
result, administrative agencies, and thus regulatory inspectors, are given little guidance 
in their enabling statutes concerning how they should shape the regulatory agenda of 
setting priorities, allocating scarce resources, and distributing the costs and benefits 
involved in the rules issued regulations (Lipsky 1971, 1977, 1980; Bryner 1997; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).   
 Some discretion, of course, is inevitable as laws cannot possibly anticipate the 
myriad of situations and circumstances that inspectors confront.  Bureaucratic 
discretion is viewed as appropriate and even essential to assure that policies are 
developed by experts and that scientific expertise and technical calculations determine 
health and safety regulations.  And, while administrative discretion is common to all 
bureaucracies, it is seen as a problem by many (Lowi 1979; Wilson 1967).  The way in 
which regulatory agencies have exercised the discretion given them has evoked 
widespread criticism by those who champion more regulatory protection and by those 
who oppose government intervention. 
 While there is no clear consensus concerning the exercise of discretion, much 
activity has been directed toward ways of limiting the discretion of regulatory 
inspectors.  A number of important devices were developed in response to these and 
other criticisms of regulatory agencies devices, ranging from changes in standard 
operating procedures within agencies to increased external scrutiny of administrative 
decision making.  For all agencies, however, the major focus of attention has been on 
limiting discretion through procedural mechanisms and devices.   
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 While much energy has been expended to invent ways to limit discretion, very 
little time has been spent discovering why inspectors exercise discretion.  Even though 
scholars have done an excellent job of cataloging numerous instances of the exercise 
of inspector discretion, most have been concerned with whether the exercise of 
discretion constituted “good” or “bad” behavior.  In this chapter I add to the previous 
research in important ways.  As noted earlier, I steer away from the normative 
question about the good or bad nature of bureaucratic discretion.  Instead, I focus first 
upon the circumstances under which street level bureaucrats exercise discretion.  
Included is why do some bureaucrats exercise discretion and others do not?  Second, I 
utilize data from a national survey of building departments and inspectors.  Thus, the 
scope of the study is greater than the traditional examination of one limited set of 
inspectors (e.g., meat inspectors from one USDA office) or simply a case study that 
relies upon anecdotal evidence of inspector discretion.  Lastly, this study examines an 
oft-overlooked group of regulatory inspectors that are vital to the health and well-
being of nearly all citizens.  By engaging in this type of research, I am able to 
comment more comprehensively on why inspectors exercise discretion and why they 
do not. 
 Measuring the concept of discretion is a slippery task.  If inspectors were simply 
asked if they exercised discretion, one would probably get a range of answers covering 
the spectrum from “yes” to “no” to “it depends on the situation.”  None of them 
convey much information.  The dichotomy of yes or no does not evoke a rich set of 
responses.  However, if inspectors were allowed to comment in an open-ended format, 
     
80
they would surely run the gamut of responses that would also only apply to individual 
situations.  What is needed is a set of questions that judges the attitudes of inspectors 
toward the use of discretion in differing field enforcement situations.  Until recently, 
such data were scarce.  As noted earlier, most studies relied upon observations of 
inspectors in their jobs, and they concluded either inspector's were or were not 
exercising discretion.    
More recently richer data have become available.  A national survey of building 
departments and inspectors was conducted by the University of New Orleans with the 
benefit of an NSF grant.  This survey asked a random sample of building officials a set 
of questions (see Appendix B for exact question wording) about the use of discretion 
in a variety of real enforcement situations.  While these questions do not ask directly 
whether respondents actually have exercised discretion in these situations, they 
certainly imply that they do.  As noted in Chapter 3, this battery of questions meshes 
well with numerous scholars’ measures of discretion.  These questions give insight 
into whether inspectors have “the power of free decision or latitude of choice.”  In 
addition, these questions measure whether street-level bureaucrats “adapt to local 
situations”.   
 The mail surveys and participant observation took place from 1994 to 1995.  The 
mail survey was returned by 819 governments (83% response rate), providing a highly 
accurate, nationally representative picture of code enforcement in local governments.  
The follow up mail survey was based on the original survey of 819 governments.  Two 
hundred jurisdictions were chosen from the original 819 for inclusion in the second 
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sample.  Of the 200 departments contacted, 69 building departments participated in the 
survey for a response rate of 34.5 percent.  In the data for this study, inspector’s 
responses were matched with their agency responses.  This technique allows me to 
compare results for supervisors and line workers in perceptions of actions and 
discretion.  
Factors Influencing Discretion 
 Much has changed since Lipsky (1980) published his influential work on street 
(or lower) level bureaucrats.  The environment in which bureaucratic discretion is 
exercised and evaluated has changed considerably (Scholz and Wei 1986; Keiser and 
Soss 1998; Brehm and Gates 1997; Burby and May 1998; Burby et al., 1986; Vinzant 
and Crothers 1999).  A product of these changes has been the increased scope and 
range, due to greater complexity, of street level discretion.  Bureaucrats face an ever 
increasing array of pressures.  The pressure to perform comes from numerous places, 
including organizational and managerial objectives:  Others are political.  Some are 
based on changing public and community expectations.  Still others arise from the 
changing nature of the problems street-level workers confront.  I now turn to a 
synopsis of the various themes upon which this chapter are based, including the 
following:  (1) inspectors will vary greatly in the exercise of discretion, (2) various 
factors will play an integral role in the exercise of inspector discretion, and (3) internal 
factors will be more influential than external factors in shaping the exercise of 
inspector discretion. 
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 When internal and external factors that influence implementation and impact are 
discussed, the internal is typically in reference to such things as the internal structures 
and policies of agencies and government (e.g., standardization of employee behavior) 
and the external refers to things external to the general environment of government 
(e.g., interest group pressure).  The specific internal factors of interest here are:  
standardization of inspector behavior, agency leadership, agency technical expertise, 
agency budgets, inspector job satisfaction, inspector experience, use of flexible 
enforcement tools, use of deterrent enforcement tools, elected official involvement in 
agency decisions, and incidents of corruption or scandal.  The specific external factors 
to be examined here are:  interest group support for agency enforcement and variables 
related to growth, including population increases and new home construction.   
Internal Factors.  As noted earlier in this research, scholars have argued that the use of 
bureaucratic discretion is driven by the internal characteristics of the bureaucracy 
(Ripley 1995).  In numerous social science studies, the political attitudes and personal 
characteristics of regulatory officials appear to play no independent explanatory role; 
the agency’s internal ethos, it is assumed, is shaped by the legal, social and political 
winds that buffet the agency (Kagan 1994).  Dispersed throughout the case study 
literature (Lipsky 1980; Ackerman et al., 1973; Ackerman and Hassler 1981; Church 
and Nakamura 1993; Braithwaite 1985; Hedge et. al., 1988), however, are signs that 
agency officials at all levels frequently have minds (and interests) of their own and 
that intra-agency commitment and competence (or lack thereof) significantly affect 
regulatory enforcement style.  Agency officials sometimes resist political and 
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economic pressures, or they actively seek to influence their environment.  In short, 
regulatory behavior can be affected by variations in leadership and its effect on 
“agency culture.”   
 A potential set of internal factors—the agency’s social and economic task 
environment, elected official involvement in agency decisions, and its internal 
leadership—can simultaneously influence inspector behavior.  The intellectual 
exercise is to analyze the relative weight of each of these conditions under varying 
circumstances.   
 There is a broad based assumption (Kagan 1978; Hutter 1988; Feinstein 1989; 
Mashaw and Harfst 1991) that regulatory enforcement officials strive to maximize 
social impact as they see it, striking an intelligent balance between regulatory control 
and economic efficiency, between precaution and innovation.  They seek to 
accomplish those goals through cooperation whenever possible, but they also seek to 
accomplish that through coercion when necessary, adapting their actions to the risks 
and compliance costs presented by the case at hand and to the character of the 
regulated enterprises with which they deal.  Agencies respond to the interactions 
between the law’s abstract demands and the concrete features of each agency’s 
environment. 
 Standardization of inspector fieldwork.  Scholz’s (1994) research showing the 
limitations in using standard routines and forms to control discretion are well known.  
Just as regulations can seldom specify the exact behavior desired of regulated firms, so 
also can organizational rules and forms seldom capture the exact behavior desired of 
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inspectors and their supervisors.  Subordinates unable or unwilling to use discretion to 
enhance persuasion cannot be forced to do so with rules and forms, and they can use 
rules to reduce the ability of supervisors to control their behavior.  Adequate rules and 
forms can facilitate, but not necessarily force, the use of effective enforcement 
techniques.  To reiterate, standardization of fieldwork is an 8-item additive scale 
composed of such things as the use of inspection checklists and forms.  Higher scores 
on the scale indicate greater standardization of work.  
 Communication and computer technology have increased the information 
available to monitor and detect deviations considerably from normal patterns of field 
office and even individual officer behavior.  With current technologies, monitoring 
techniques can be developed to provide considerably greater flexibility to inspectors 
and field office supervisors.  Previous systems were limited to comparing the average 
performance of a given inspector or field office with performances of comparable 
inspectors and offices.  Deviations from standard performance would be most visible, 
and require justification that would not be evident in the data.   
 However, the primary force for shaping the enforcement culture of the inspector 
must come from the constant interaction involved in supervision and in office routines 
overseen by supervisors (Scholz 1994).  It was noted long ago that agencies with some 
sort of standardized routines for inspectors who spend much of their time in the field 
provide the much needed psychological support required (Blau 1963).  Specifically, 
this research will test the possibility that the appropriate use of discretion can be 
     
85
fostered through such mechanisms as training programs, the pairing of junior and 
senior inspectors, and the regular review of inspectors’ actions.     
 Enforcement approaches.  As has been discussed throughout this research, the 
realities of any regulation are provided by the day-to-day interaction of inspectors with 
regulated entities.  Inspectors communicate the meaning of a given regulation, and 
they exercise discretion in deciding how to deal with a particular violation of rules.  
Given these critical roles, an important management challenge is to foster a desired 
enforcement style among inspectors.  What constitutes the best enforcement style has 
been a matter of debate in the regulatory literature (May and Winter 1999).  Inspectors 
who are too informal and unwilling to invoke threats are likely to be ineffective unless 
there already is a high degree of willingness to comply.  They simply will not be taken 
seriously.  Inspectors who are too rigid and bullying will be off-putting.  If regulatees 
think inspector threats will not be backed by the relevant legal system, legalistic 
regulators will not accomplish their purpose.  
 As part of instilling the desired enforcement style, regulatory officials are trying 
to balance the desire for discretion so that inspectors use appropriate judgments with 
the need for consistency in the application of rules.  Of theoretical import here is 
whether a culture and commitment by an agency to a specific enforcement approach 
can foster that same enforcement style among that particular agency’s inspectors.  
Specifically, two enforcement approaches are examined.  The first deals with flexible 
approaches to enforcement (e.g., relaxing standards based on extenuating 
circumstances).  Higher scores on this six-item additive scale indicate greater 
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flexibility.  The second approach involves a deterrent approach to enforcement (e.g., 
the use of fines).  Higher scores on this 3-item scale indicate the greater use of 
deterrent approaches to enforcement. 
Leadership.  The environment that inspectors confront often sends mixed or 
conflicting signals, giving agency administrators several degrees of freedom.  Within 
this space, regulatory enforcement style can be affected by different kinds of 
administrative leadership.  However, there have been few systematic studies of 
leadership in regulatory agencies.  Latin (1991, 1663) suggests “Agency officials, like 
most human beings, prefer to avoid criticism and controversy whenever possible.”  
However, internal agency culture is not immutable.  With varying degrees of energy 
and success, agency leaders attempt to control front-line officials and to inculcate a 
particular regulatory ethos.  As in police work (Muir 1977), the most important factor 
in controlling discretionary enforcement may be day-to-day interactions among 
enforcement officials interactions with supervisors in particular.  Through the 
discussion of “hard cases” with knowledgeable and experienced supervisors, 
regulators learn informal norms concerning the interpretation of regulations (Kagan 
1978,  Ch.6), the methods of identifying and dealing with untrustworthy enterprises, 
and cost-effective compliance methods to convey to regulated firms, and, most 
importantly, a confidence-building sense of priorities regarding discretion (Blau 
1955).  The intent here is to determine the amount of influence that supervisors’ 
exercise over their line level personnel in their daily regulatory behaviors.  This 
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variable is a measure of inspector’s perceptions of their agency leadership.  Higher 
scores on this additive scale indicate stronger/better leadership. 
Capacity for enforcement.  A common refrain among most regulatory agencies 
is the need for more staff.  A recognized reality among public administrators from 
urban street departments to rural electric cooperatives is that they cannot do 
everything they are supposed to do.  Political authorities’ priorities leave some 
regulatory agencies with far lower inspector-to-site ratios than others, a phenomenon 
which affects the frequency of inspection and hence enforcement style.  In periods of 
retrenchment, political authorities may force regulators to change their enforcement 
methods even more by making across-the-board budget cuts.  Smaller budgets may 
encourage some agencies to avoid costly legal contestation by adopting a more 
conciliatory style.  If budget cuts and layoffs undercut morale, an agency may fade 
into a retreatist mode (Hull 1992).  Still other researchers have suggested that if the 
ratio of regulators to regulated enterprises shrinks, inspectors cannot come as often 
and the agency might wish to compensate by adopting a more deterrence-oriented 
style (Kagan 1994; Wood 1998).  The intent is to provide insight into the role that 
resources, both financial and technical, play in influencing enforcement styles.  Two 
measures of capacity are utilized here.  Both measures of capacity are perceptions of 
about inspector’s levels of technical expertise and budget adequacy.  Higher scores 
indicate greater capacity. 
Situational influences.  It may be true, as the legal realists said, “that rules 
don’t decide cases.  People do.”  Essentially, inspectors must decide which firms to 
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inspect and what to look for during inspections.  They must apply abstract regulations 
to concrete situations and decide whether a violation exists and whether an existing 
violation is worth citing.  The inspector provides a critical link in enforcement 
strategies because it is at this level that the agency must differentiate between 
cooperative firms and noncompliant ones.   
Kagan (1994) has noted that inspectors need sufficient substantive knowledge 
not only to recognize violations but also to prove to firms they know their jobs, to 
assist in problem-solving, and to recognize when a firm is not cooperating.  They also 
need skills in persuasive interactions.  Enforcement agencies may do well to emulate 
the training that insurance companies provide for their inspectors, training which 
includes the utilization of discretion to persuade compliance.  What is of interest is the 
extent to which characteristics such as experience and job satisfaction influence 
inspector behaviors.   
 Politics.  The nature of regulations often reflect the views of the winners in a 
political debate over how stringently an agency’s legal mission should be stated, the 
powers it will have, the discretion administrators will be granted (Kagan 1994; Moe 
1989).  These regulatory designs are shaped by many political factors, including 
political culture, political parties, and legal doctrines (Vogel 1986; Badaracco 1985; 
Kagan 1988; Katzenstein 1988).  
 While these influences are broad in nature, it is necessary to focus on a more 
limited set of political influences: those that impinge on frontline, day-to-day 
regulatory administration after the formulation of basic regulatory laws and 
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bureaucratic structures.  Arguing that continuing political influences affect inspector 
behavior requires a shift in assumptions about regulatory behavior.  There is an oft 
cited assumption that regulatory officials seek to maximize public welfare and that 
their enforcement style reflects rational adaptation to the problems generated by the 
regulatory law and the task environment.  Explanations based on the agency’s political 
environment, however, shift the operative assumption from that of a “welfare-
maximizing agency” to a “criticism avoiding agency.”  (Nichols and Zeckhauser 
1986).   
 Kagan (1994) identified several assumptions underlying this paradigmatic shift.  
They are as follows:  (1) with varying degrees of intensity, political leaders seek to 
affect agency behavior through the appointment of sympathetic administrators, 
manipulation of the news media, threats of budgetary restrictions, and appeals to the 
courts, (2) regulatory officials seek to avoid political trouble in order to keep their jobs 
and maintain their agency’s powers and budget, (3) regulatory officials shape their 
enforcement style to avoid political trouble, adopting a legalistic style when they are 
most subject to criticism by political leaders or influential outsiders for real or 
suspected laxity, favoring a more accommodative style when those risks are not 
present or when they are subject to criticism for excessive strictness. 
 Elected public officials have little interest in most regulatory programs (Russell 
1990).  Nevertheless, with varying degrees of frequency and intensity, political 
authorities do affect some inspectors behavior: by appointing or influencing the 
appointment of, higher agency officials; by expanding or contracting agency resources 
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through the budget process; by legislative oversight hearings; and sometimes by 
telling agency officials how they would like particular regulatory matters of urgent 
political concern to be handled.   
 Regulatory officials usually are adept at reading the tenor of their political 
environment and at shaping enforcement methods accordingly (Frank and Lombness 
1988; Hutter 1988).  Scandals and catastrophes fall under the realm of the political 
environment of regulatory inspector’s.  Kagan (1994) noted that widely publicized 
catastrophes that fall within an agency’s jurisdiction often trigger agency-changing 
political intervention.  In the aftermath of a televised hotel fire, a death-dealing tunnel 
collapse, or a highly visible oil spill, political leaders often respond by holding 
hearings, replacing agency heads, and calling for new, more rigorously enforced 
regulations.  A recent catastrophe is a reasonably good predictor of a more zealous, 
legalistic enforcement style, at least for a while.   
 A stringent regulatory program occasionally generates sustained political 
opposition which political leaders try to defuse (or capitalize upon, depending on 
whether they are in or out of power) by pushing the agency to change its enforcement 
policy.  (For numerous examples of this phenomena see Levin 1979; Scholz 1991; 
Scholz et al. 1991; Singer and Murphy 1988; Noble 1986; Scholz and Wei 1986; 
Kniesner and Leeth 1991).  Moreover, a rapid shift toward accommodative 
enforcement also can stimulate political opposition by advocacy groups, disgruntled 
regulatory officials, and opposition politicians (Russell 1990; Wood 1988; Wood and 
Waterman 1991).  These scholars suggest that some regulatory issues have moved 
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toward the center of the contemporary political stage and that inspector behavior will 
more often become a matter of political controversy and intervention.  Essentially, this 
is a test of the proposition that inspectors are affected by their political and task 
environments.  Of particular interest here is the effect that elected official involvement 
in code decisions and incidents of corruption have on the attitudes of inspectors 
toward discretion.  This variable is an interval level measure of local elected official 
involvement.  Higher scores indicate greater propensity of elected official 
involvement. 
External Factors.  A primary theme in this discussion is the need for discretion to 
adopt enforcement tactics that are appropriate for given situations facing the agency.  
Although the basic tactics and strategies of enforcement are universal, the external 
environment of enforcement agencies can dramatically alter the choice and 
effectiveness of appropriate tactics and strategies.  We now know that field office 
discretion arises from the generic problem of interpreting national regulations under a 
diversity of changing local conditions (Bardach and Kagan 1982; Diver 1980; 
Hawkins 1984).  In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the varying local 
situations that inspectors confront leads to considerable variation in the way different 
inspectors (Feinstein 1989) and field offices (Hedge , 1988; Shover , 1984; Hutter 
1988) enforce the same law, and even to variation in the way similar cases are treated 
in the same office (Kagan 1978).  The specific external variables of interest here are 
pro-interest groups support for strong code enforcement and population and building 
growth in the various jurisdictions.   
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 Interest group pressure.  Among scholars, Moe (1989) has been successful in 
documenting interest group influence during the regulatory process.  He has 
documented the success of business interests in opposing regulation, in weakening 
regulatory agencies through statutory features that divide important functions among 
separate and competing agencies, in limiting access to information necessary for 
enforcement, in imposing cumbersome administrative procedures on rule-making and 
enforcement procedures, and in providing multiple points at which agency decisions 
can be challenged.  The courts also have encouraged contentious interest groups to 
mount challenges to agency procedures and decisions, limiting the flexibility of 
agencies and drastically slowing their ability to resolve issues (Kagan 1990). 
 However, the hypothesis to be tested here investigates pro-interest group support 
and its effect on discretion.  Scholz (1991) was one of the first to raise the possibility 
that even supporters of regulatory policies have limited the ability of the agency to 
develop effective enforcement strategies.  He pointed out that among agencies there 
was a concern that agency discretion would lead to capture by business interests.  This 
in turn prompted supporters to require agencies to pursue stringent deterrence-oriented 
strategies while limiting discretion at the same time.  Interest group pressure is 
measured with an index of support for strong code enforcement.  Higher scores 
indicate greater pro-interest group support for strong code enforcement. 
 Growth.  There are several ways to measure growth when considering building 
regulations.  The two facets of growth to be considered here are population growth 
over a 10 year period and new home construction over a 10 year period.   Following 
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the lead of May and Burby (1994), new home construction serves as a proxy for 
community resources or community capacity for addressing problems.  It seems 
reasonable to assume that faster growing areas are more likely to be forced to deal 
with a plethora of development issues, including hazard-prone areas, and subsequently 
will be forced to invest in expertise and staff for such purposes.  Population serves as a 
proxy for economic resources, since comparability of costs and expenditures across 
jurisdictions is problematic. 
 With growth comes an increased level of professionalization of staff for which 
larger cities have more specialized functions.  Increasing growth and rising 
professionalization create demand for regulatory controls.  While demand for 
regulatory controls increases, resources are not always allocated to meet these 
demands, causing gaps in implementation of regulations.  The effects of growth on 
inspector behavior will be examined here.  Specifically, I want to determine what 
effect growth has on the propensity of inspectors to exercise discretion.    
Findings 
This chapter empirically addresses the exercise of inspector discretion.  As 
noted earlier, the criterion for gauging discretion is the amount of discretion exercised 
by building inspectors in various (e.g., routine or difficult) enforcement situations.  As 
noted earlier, discretion is measured with a 7-item additive scale that determines 
inspectors’ behaviors in or utilization of discretion in differing enforcement situations.  
Figure 4.1 is a representation of dispersion of the frequency with which various 
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building departments exercise discretion and Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 represent 
OLS models of the various propositions highlighted above. 
 The results show that the exercise of discretion varied greatly among the 
inspectors from each department (see Figure 4.1).  The scores in the figure represent 
the degree to which inspectors exercise discretion and the frequency of that exercise of 
discretion.  With a theoretical range from 7 to 35, the scores ranged from 8.65 to 27.75 
on the additive scale.  As noted earlier, higher scores indicate greater propensity to 
exercise discretion.  The mean score for exercise of discretion was 18.  The modal 
score (multiple modes existed, the smallest value is reported here) was 16.  The mean 
and modal scores indicate a moderate degree of discretion being practiced by most of  
the building agencies involved.  The standard deviation for the exercise of discretion 
was 3.63.   
 When scholars first attempted to define the role of public administrators at the 
turn of the century, their thinking was based on formal organization theory and a strict 
separation between politics and administration.  Bureaucrats were deemed responsible 
for the efficient and politically neutral execution of the public will as defined by 
public officials.  As such, this model of discretion was not really an issue.  Politicians 
were expected to make decisions while bureaucrats carried them out.  These findings 
suggest that this is no longer the case.  Regulatory inspectors are either more willing to 
or are forced by the vagaries of current policies to exercise discretion.  These findings 
show clear evidence of the bottom-up method of implementation at work.  Regulatory 
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inspectors responsible for implementation play a positive, necessary, and appropriate 
role in redefining and refocusing policy in light of line-level realities.       
 
FIGURE 4.1
FREQUENCY OF INSPECTOR DISCRETION
(SOURCE:  UNO SURVEY OF BUILDING INSPECTORS)
(THEORETICAL RANGE 7 to 35)
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I now turn to the influences on the propensity to exercise discretion.  The 
measures of internal and external influences upon discretion in Table 4.1 explain 59% 
of the overall variation in inspector discretion (Adjusted R2).  The findings indicate 
that both internal and external factors have statistically significant effects on 
discretion.  Again, the data confirm a major assumption suggested earlier in the study.  
Internal factors exert more influence than external factors in shaping the exercise of 
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inspector discretion, with five of ten internal factors achieving statistical significance 
compared to only one of three external factors.  It is obvious that that there are triple 
the amount of internal factors compared to external factors.  However, when separated 
into competing models (see Table 4.2 versus Table 4.3); the internal factors continue 
to explain significantly more variance than their internal counterparts (58% to 9%).  
The key internal structural influences are standardization of inspector behavior, 
agency leadership and use of deterrent enforcement tools.  Specifically, the findings 
indicate that the standardization of inspector behavior (p<.01) and deterrent 
enforcement tools (p<.05) limit the use of discretion by regulatory inspectors.  
Furthermore, those inspectors that perceive strong agency leadership exercise higher 
levels of discretion (p<.01).   
Perceptions of strong agency leadership have the reverse effect on discretion.  
Agency leadership (measured on a 0 to 12 additive scale) that is perceived to be strong 
has a positive effect on discretion, or as perceptions become more favorable discretion 
increases.  A one category jump in perceptions of inspector discretion produces a .43 
increase in inspector discretion.  If taking the agency leadership scale as a whole, with 
positive perceptions in every category on the scale, the propensity to exercise 
discretion would increase 5.16 on the 7 to 35 scale of inspector discretion. 
In other words, changes in each of these independent variables produces 
statistically significant changes in the dependent variable, in this case, discretion.  A 
one degree change in the standardization of inspector behavior, measured on a 0 to 8  
additive scale, would produce a .59 decrease in the propensity of inspector’s to 
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exercise discretion (measured on a 7 to 35 scale).  Put another way, running the entire 
scale of standardization of inspector behavior, with a score of 8 would produce a 4.72 
decrease in the exercise of discretion.     
The other aspects of internal influence that exert statistically significant effects 
are job satisfaction and inspector experience.  Inspectors who are satisfied with their 
jobs exercise less discretion, while inspectors who are more experienced are more apt 
to exercise discretion.  The specific effects of job satisfaction (measured on a 1 to 10 
scale) are as follows:  when satisfaction with the job increases there is a .80 decrease 
in the level of discretion being exercised.  In other words, a 1 level increase in job 
satisfaction would produce an 8 degree decrease in inspector discretion.  On the other 
hand, inspector experience produces increases in satisfaction.  For instance, for every 
year of inspector experience there is a .17 increase in the level of inspector discretion.  
It would take ten years to raise the level of inspector discretion one full degree.  It 
should be noted here that mutual causation may be in effect here.  In other words, job 
satisfaction may be tied directly to incidents of corruption.  This could be the case in a 
number of scenarios.  For instance, inspectors that work for an agency that has 
experienced corruption may be chronically unhappy.  Or, on the other hand, unhappy 
inspectors may engage in corrupt activities.   
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Table 4.1 
Comprehensive Model of 
Internal and External Factors Affecting 
The Exercise of Inspector Discretion 
  
Þ B 
Internal Factors:   
Standardization of Inspector 
Behavior 
  -.591** 
(.19) 
-.29 
Agency Leadership    .438** 
(.14) 
.33 
Level of Technical Expertise -.417 
(.35) 
-.11 
Adequacy of Budget .320 
(.32) 
.09 
Job Satisfaction -.808* 
(.30) 
-.23 
Inspector Experience    .178** 
(.05) 
.29 
Use of Flexible Enforcement 
Tools 
-.012 
(.02) 
-.05 
Use of Deterrent Enforcement 
Tools 
-.028* 
(.01) 
-.25 
Elected Officials Involved in 
Code Decisions 
.403 
(.41) 
.10 
Incident of 
Corruption/Sanctions 
.326 
(.23) 
.14 
External Factors:   
Interest Group Pressure for 
Strong Enforcement 
.002 
(.01) 
.01 
 
Population (natural log) 
 
    -.0001** 
(.00) 
 
-.23 
Percentage of New Housing 
Units (10 yrs.) 
-.039 
(.02) 
-.13 
 
R2 
 
.66 
 
Adjusted R2 .59  
F       8.76***  
N 70  
P<.05*, p<.01**, p<.001*** 
Ь=unstandardized regression coefficients  
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
(Source:  UNO National Survey of Local Building Departments) 
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The use of deterrent enforcement tools is statistically significant in the 
hypothesized direction.  It was posited that less flexible approaches would be 
negatively related to discretion.  In other words, as the use of inflexible approaches to 
enforcement increased, discretion would decrease.  This is clearly the case with the 
use of standard deterrent enforcement approaches.  As the use of deterrence increases, 
the exercise of inspector discretion decreases.  The use of fines as a deterrent 
enforcement tool also produces a decrease in inspector discretion.  For example, a one 
category increase in the use of fines, measured with a 3-item additive scale, would 
decrease inspector discretion .02 on a scale of 0 to 35.   
 The findings shown in Table 4.1 regarding environmental or external factors are 
inconsistent with my assumptions about their importance in influencing inspector 
discretion.  These results suggest that inspectors confronted with populations that are 
large do not develop coping mechanisms to effectively carry out their jobs.  In 
essence, when confronted with increasing workloads, larger territories, and fewer 
resources, inspectors are not necessarily forced to exercise discretion to deal with their 
case loads.  The effects of population density appear to effect minimal change.  For 
every one person increase in population in the last ten years, there has been a 
corresponding .0001 decrease in inspector discretion.  Put more simply, it would take 
an increase of ten thousand individuals in a particular jurisdiction to produce a 1 
degree change in the level of inspector discretion.   
 When observed individually, it does not appear that any variable is the single 
causal factor in explaining the propensity to exercise inspector discretion.  However, 
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when take together, as a whole the model is able to explain much of the variance.  It is 
posited here that this is a reflection of the real world of regulatory policy 
implementation.  In other words, it is not a single factor that best explains successful 
implementation, but rather a conglomeration of factors.   
 To ensure that multicollinearity was not a possible cause for the low coefficients, 
the inverse of a correlation was used.  The diagonal elements of this matrix are called 
variance inflation factors.  Using the rule of thumb (Kennedy 1996) for standardized 
data, no variables were greater than 10.  This gives even more confidence that the 
findings are both valid and reliable. 
 Lastly, in Table 4.2 one can see that political factors, whether internal or external, 
had no discernible effect on the exercise of discretion.  Elected officials, interest 
groups, and corruption all fail to exert any statistically significant effects upon 
inspector discretion. 
         Table 4.3 represents OLS findings of a separate model that was constructed to 
ferret out the effects that each of the internal factors would have independent of the 
various external factors that were also examined.  In the same vein, Table 4.4 
represents OLS findings of a separate model that was constructed to determine the 
effect that each of the external factors would have independent of the various internal 
factors that were included in the comprehensive model in Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.2 
Internal Factors Affecting 
The Exercise of Inspector Discretion 
  
Þ B 
Standardization of Inspector 
Behavior 
       -.596**** 
(.17) 
-.30 
Agency Leadership   .296* 
(.12) 
.26 
(table cont.) 
Level of Technical Expertise -.518 
(.33) 
-.14 
Adequacy of Budget .300 
(.31) 
.08 
Job Satisfaction        -1.04**** 
(.28) 
-.31 
Inspector Experience          .199**** 
(.05) 
.35 
Use of Flexible Enforcement 
Tools 
-.015 
(.02) 
-.06 
Use of Deterrent Enforcement 
Tools 
-.019 
(.01) 
-.16 
 
Elected Officials Involved in 
Code Decisions 
-.034 
(.37) 
-.00 
Incident of 
Corruption/Sanctions 
  .555* 
(.21) 
.24 
 
R2 
 
.63 
 
Adjusted R2 .58  
F           11.98****  
N 78  
P<.10* P<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Ь=unstandardized regression coefficients  
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
(Source:  UNO National Survey of Local Building Departments) 
 
It is clear from both of these tables that internal factors continue to offer greater 
predictive power in explaining attitudes toward discretion than does the various 
external factors.  Internal factors are able to account for 58% of the variance in 
inspector discretion, where external factors only explain 9% of the variance.  The 
assertion that internal conditions are more important than external conditions in 
determining inspector behavior is clearly confirmed by these separate models.  
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Whether the external environment is sending mixed or conflicting signals or just 
allowing administrators too much freedom, internal factors are the driving force in 
inspector discretion.   
 
 
TABLE 4.3 
ENVIRONMENTAL/EXTERNAL VARIABLES 
INFLUENCING INSPECTOR DISCRETION 
 Þ B 
Interest Group Support for 
Strong Enforcement 
   -.033** 
(.01) 
-.23 
Percentage of New Housing 
Units 
-.029 
(.03) 
-.10 
Population (natural log)   -.00018** 
(.00) 
-.26 (table cont.) 
R2 .12  
Adjusted R2 .09  
F     3.46**  
N 75  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
(Source:  UNO National Survey of Local Building Departments) 
 
This conclusion is further supported when constructing the “best-fit model” 
shown in Table 4.4.  Only one external factor, population, meets the criteria for being 
included in the model.  And, as noted earlier, it statistical influence is fleeting.  
However, this does not mean that the external factors are void of influence in shaping 
inspector attitudes toward behavior.  This can be seen with the comprehensive model 
offering greater predictive power than the best-fit model, 59% to 52%, in predicting 
inspector attitudes toward discretion.   
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TABLE 4.4 
BEST FIT MODEL FOR FACTORS INFLUENCING 
INSPECTOR DISCRETION IN ENFORCING BUILDING REGULATIONS 
 Þ B 
Interest Group Support for 
Strong Code Enforcement 
-.001 
(.01) 
-.08 
Population (natural log)       -.00017*** 
(.00) 
-.23 
Agency Leadership      .361*** 
(.12) 
.27 
Standardization of Inspector 
Behavior 
      -.855**** 
(.17) 
-.43 
Incident of 
Corruption/Sanctions 
     .585*** 
(.21) 
.26 
Job Satisfaction      -.994*** 
(.31) 
-.28  
Inspector Experience      .164*** 
(.05) 
.29 
R2 .56  
Adjusted R2 .52  
F          12.28****  
N 72  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
(Source:  UNO National Survey of Local Building Departments) 
 
To further illustrate how the predictors included in this model affect inspector 
attitudes toward discretion, values of the dependent variable were calculated while 
manipulating the values of the independent variables.  First, all the independent 
variables were set to their values hypothesized to produce the least discretion.  For 
example, interest group support was set to zero (0), its lowest value.  The regression 
equation was then calculated and the resulting Y value equaled 24.64.  Thus, when all 
independent variables are set at their least values, that should produce the least amount 
of discretion, in this case 18.73.  Conversely, when the regression equation is 
calculated with all independent variables set to their values hypothesized to produce 
the most discretion the estimated value of the dependent variable is 24.64.  Overall, 
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this illustrates a 5.91 point difference (on a 28 point scale, range 7 t0 35) in inspectors 
hypothesized to exercise the least discretion and those hypothesized to exercise the 
most discretion.   
The findings as well as implications of these findings will be further discussed 
in Chapter Five, which focuses on the influences and expectations regarding industry 
compliance with regulations.   
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Chapter 5:  Regulatory Compliance 
 
 Safety standards generally impose concentrated costs and confer dispersed public 
or private benefits.  Shortfalls often are due to concentrated costs.  As noted in 
previous portions of this study, scholars (May 1999, Burby et al., 1996; Burby and 
May 1997) have pointed to shortfalls in building-code enforcement and compliance as 
obstacles in reducing loss of life and property in natural disasters.  This chapter 
extends the research on code enforcement to consider the role of various factors (e.g., 
enforcement styles, attitude congruence between agencies and inspectors) that 
influence the building industry to comply with building regulations. 
 This chapter specifically relates how local enforcement of building code 
regulations affects compliance.  In essence, inspectors are charged with an overall 
evaluation of how effective the building code enforcement program is in their 
jurisdiction.   The specific measure is an effectiveness rating for attaining compliance 
with building code requirements on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating low 
compliance with code requirements and 10 being complete compliance with code 
requirements.  And, as noted earlier, a key contribution is ferreting out the influence of 
inspector’s different styles (i.e., level of discretion) on regulatee compliance.  Thus, I 
am moving away from implements of implementation toward testing determinants of 
policy impact and the influence of the former on the latter.   
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 The extant literature covering regulatory enforcement (implementation) and 
compliance (impact) draws upon a multitude of theories and the presumed efficacy of 
each in bringing about compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Bardach and Kagan 
1982; Braithwaite 1985; Burby and Patterson 1993; Burby 1995; Eckberg 1997; 
Gormley 1997).  Most of the studies attempt to disentangle the day-to-day style of 
inspection from agency enforcement actions.  This chapter builds on this research 
agenda and draws a distinction between enforcement styles of regulatory bodies and 
compliance choices made by the private sector.   
 There are various approaches to regulatory enforcement.  Among the earliest 
scholars to draw a distinction in regulatory enforcement were Bardach and Kagan 
(1992).  The dominant distinction drawn was between the by-the-book enforcement 
entailing a legalistic approach, such as levying fines against noncompliant entities, and 
what is labeled as cooperative enforcement involving a flexible approach, such as 
allowing firms to sell pollution credits.   
 To draw even more distinct lines between by-the-book and flexible enforcement, 
this chapter distinguishes the behavior of inspectors from the choices of regulatory 
agencies.  Following the lead of May and Burby (1998) and May and Winter (1999), 
the day-to-day interactions of inspectors with regulatees and choices made by 
enforcement agencies constitute regulatory enforcement.  The behavior of inspectors 
and the enforcement decisions of agencies differ with respect to specific enforcement 
choices and levels at which they are made.  The behavior of inspectors makes up 
enforcement styles while agency-level choices constitute an overall enforcement 
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strategy.  In concert, inspectors’ behavior and agency choices seek to bring about 
compliance with regulations.   
 A common approach in the study of compliance is to dichotomize organizations 
according to whether they comply or fail to comply with a policy.  This approach does 
not take into account differences in the amount of compliance that could possibly take 
place.  The use of a variable that considers degrees of compliance allows theoretically 
interesting lines of inquiry that would be foreclosed by using a compliant/non-
compliant dichotomy.   
 Failure to comply is an immense problem.  Violations result from the acts of 
innocent individuals, from the refined plans of sophisticated criminal groups, and from 
the actions of governmental entities whose other activities promote compliance 
(DiMento 1989).  The range of behavior involved in noncompliance is similarly 
wide—from falsifying reports to building with known inferior materials.   
 Most inspectorates are considered ineffective unless most of their regulatees are 
either in compliance or on the way to it.  However, almost all inspectorates have very 
limited staffing and funding in comparison to the regulatees (Hawkins 1984; Grabosky 
and Braithwaite 1986; Bardach and Kagan 1982; Hutter 1988).  Compliance obviously 
involves the effective management of the relationship between the two parties so as to 
achieve the best practicable results over time.  A section of this chapter is focused on 
the skills deployed in managing this relationship.  The implicit question being:  given 
that most agencies and inspectors operate under substantial restraints of resources and 
powers, what factors and resources will get the best results, the most compliance?  
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Serious questions are not pursued, questions such as whether what is being achieved is 
adequate.  Rather, the focus is on how inspectors have achieved their respective 
degrees of compliance from regulatees.       
Factors Influencing Compliance   
 Regulatory enforcement has experienced dramatic growth in recent years.  
Accompanying this focus to regulate behavior has been an attempt to develop 
systematic approaches to behavior of enforcement agencies and inspectors.  However, 
and as noted earlier, there is no real consensus about it.  Given this search for the ideal 
behavior that agencies and inspectors should pursue, this chapter has a four-pronged 
foci of investigation; (1) enforcement approaches (agency behaviors), (2) enforcement 
styles (inspector discretion), (3) agency capacity to enforce regulations, and (4) the 
local regulatory environment.  There is less of an attempt in this chapter to determine 
whether is it factors that are internal or external to inspector’s and agency’s 
environments that are exerting influence on the dependent variable, compliance.  
Rather, the attempt here is to determine what strategies or factors are most effective in 
bringing about compliance with regulatory directives.   
 Enforcement approaches.  Scholz (1994) recognized that enforcement is never 
simple.  Furthermore, he pointed out that the techniques for obtaining policy goals are 
constrained not only by the need for regulations and enforcement that encourage 
efficiency on the part of regulated firms and other entities but also by the need for 
enforcement techniques that are both efficient and within the rather ambiguous limits 
on government coercive power set by the political system.   
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 Such constraints have encouraged the development of “voluntary compliance” as 
the primary enforcement philosophy of federal regulatory agencies.  This philosophy 
takes on many forms, but essentially it recognizes the need for educational and 
persuasive techniques to complement the coercive, deterrence-oriented techniques at 
the core of most enforcement programs.  Table 5.1, provided below, highlights the 
basic components of a three-faceted approach developed by Kagan and Scholz (1984) 
to clarify the basic components of the voluntary compliance approach.   
 
While the enforcement approaches have been expanded beyond this basic framework 
in recent years (see Burby and May 1994; Burby and May 1998), this basic framework 
outlined in Table 5.1 provides insight to the various approaches to be tested here.  Of 
interest is which enforcement approach is most effective in bringing about 
compliance.  Various enforcement approaches are examined.  Each of the approaches 
(flexible, incentives, standardized fieldwork, and fines) are measured with additive 
scales.  Higher scores on each of the scales indicate a greater propensity to utilize that 
particular enforcement approach.   
          Discretion/Cohesion.  It has been hypothesized that an internal bureau 
characteristic that contributes to its power base is agency cohesion.  Meier (1993) 
defines cohesion as the commitment of bureau members to the organization and its 
ideals.  Further, case study analyses point to limiting discretion as the means for 
achieving industry compliance (Miller 1992; Bianco and Bates 1989).  However, there 
is certainly a counter view to this emphasis on cohesion and limiting discretion.  
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Beginning with Herbert Kaufman’s The Forest Ranger (1960), scholars not only 
found that bureaucrats had policy preferences and the need for resources to secure 
implementation, but bureaucrats’ preferences might lead them to significantly alter 
their behavior the preferences of  their superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy.  The 
measure of discretion is the dependent variable from Chapter 4.  This 7-item additive 
scale evaluates inspector’s perceptions of the exercise of discretion.  The scores 
ranged from 8.65 to 27.75 on an additive scale of 7 to 35.  Higher scores indicate 
greater propensity to use discretion.  
 Furthermore, it has been pointed out those supervisors at all levels of public 
bureaucracies face constraints not dreamed of by managers in private firms.  
Production in public bureaucracies nearly always differs from production in private 
firms, not just in the form of the goods produced (which is not always a materiel 
products and may often be a public good), but in the competing standards for what 
comprises efficient production (Wilson 1989). 
 A message that is consistently enforced by bottom-up theorists is that 
bureaucracies are best defined by “tasks,” the things that bureaucrats learn to do, 
rather than abstract, often internally contradictory goals.  It is difficult to provide much 
precision behind an organizational goal such as to “promote the long-range security 
and interests of the United States” (Wilson 1989, 32), the goal of the State 
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TABLE 5.1 
BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE 
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE APPROACH 
DETERENCE 
STRATEGY 
This approach is based on the assumption 
that regulated entities are amoral, and they 
will not obey regulations without an 
incentive.  The deterrence strategy uses 
coercive means to provide incentives by 
punishing all noncompliant firms.  The basic 
tactics include methods of monitoring firms 
to detect noncompliance and the imposition 
of penalties sufficient to deter future 
noncompliance. 
EDUCATIONAL 
STRATEGY 
This approach assumes that at least some 
noncompliance stems from the difficulty 
certain firms have with understanding 
regulations and with implementing effective 
internal controls to prevent noncompliance.  
Although fines and punishment may force 
noncompliant firms to focus more clearly on 
regulatory duties, they may also further 
distract firms or provide only temporary 
cures for recurrent problems.  Basic tactics 
for the educational strategy consist of 
methods to provide compliance information 
in a usable form and to establish 
organizational routines necessary for future 
compliance.  They do not shy away from 
coercion, but they use it to focus attention 
rather than to punish noncompliers. 
PERSUASIVE 
OR 
COOPERATIVE 
STRATEGY 
This approach assumes that firms perceive  
enforcement agencies as one of several 
important actors that the firm must deal with 
over the long haul.  Furthermore, it assumes 
that firms develop principles to govern their 
relationships with all actors.  Thus a firm 
may forgo short-term temptations to cheat on 
an agency that cannot easily monitor its 
activities in order to establish (table cont.)  
a more cooperative long-term relationship 
with the agency and with others in its 
environment.  Tactics for this strategy 
include techniques to convince firms in the 
agency’s jurisdiction that it is in their long-
term best interest to comply.   
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 Department.  But bureaucrats in the State Department do many things, and their 
tasks are shaped by a process of trial and error in a sometimes competitive 
environment.  “People matter, but organization matters also, and tasks matter most of 
all” (Wilson 1989, 173).  In other words, bureaucrats and the decisions they make are 
shaped by the jobs they undertake and the environments in which they operate.     
 Chapter 4 of this study covered the exercise of discretion in the regulations of 
building codes and inspectors’ exercise varying levels of discretion, with most 
exercising moderate degrees of discretion.  We now understand that bureaucracies are 
not unitary actors with homogenous preferences.  The evidence in Chapter 4 was 
drawn from a national sample of building departments that covered a multitude of 
locales across the United States, and inspectors in these locales varied in their attitudes 
toward the exercise of discretion.  However, we still must try to extricate the effects 
this exercise of discretion has on the decision of regulatees whether to comply with 
policy directives.  And furthermore, are inspector actions more important than agency 
actions or the regulatory environment in achieving compliance? 
 Agency capacity.  Along with cooperative approaches, many scholars have 
posited that an important feature of policy design is building local capacity for 
achieving state goals (May and Burby 1994).  While psychological and political 
obstacles potentially stand in the way of enforcing compliance, agency capacity is still 
a formidable barrier.  The practical barrier of agency capacity is at least more 
tractable.  If it is true that compliance might be enhanced through financial and 
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technical assistance, capacity might be a central pursuit of local regulatory officials.  
Since many cooperative mandates lack coercive elements to force compliance when 
commitment is lacking, agency capacity may be the answer through the provision of 
technical expertise and the carrot of financial resources to achieve compliance. 
 To determine the effects that agency capacity has on the decision of whether 
regulatees decide to comply with building code regulations, several measures of 
capacity are considered.  The code enforcement staff was the focus of the capacity of 
building departments since the code enforcement staff in most agencies are charged 
with the day-to-day enforcement of building code regulations.  The building agencies 
were asked to rate each of the aspects of capacity on a 5-point scale with 1 being least 
adequate and 5 being most adequate.  The specific measures of agency capacity are:  
adequacy of non-personnel budget, adequacy of staffing, agency technical expertise, 
and authority for enforcing codes.  
 Environmental/External Controls.  Examining external or political environment 
variables is in direct contrast to the perspective that assumes official action is shaped 
by the technical, economic and legal problems encountered by the agency.  This 
second explanatory approach emphasizes the regulatory agency’s political or external 
environment.  Regardless of the law and the regulators’ notions of what would be best, 
it is assumed, regulators work within a charged political atmosphere.  Interest groups 
attempt to control the agency’s leadership.  Those who offend politically significant 
government officials or private organizations face severe challenges in implementing 
desired policies.  Understanding compliance as a byproduct of the intensity and 
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predominant direction of the political pressures brought to bear on regulatory officials 
by political leaders, industry, proregulatory advocacy groups and the growth of 
particular jurisdictions is vital to an understanding of policy impact.   
 Of specific interest here is what impact that interest groups, local politics, and 
growth have on regulatee compliance with building regulations.  The local political 
context is measured as the extent of support for strong enforcement of building codes 
by key groups in each community.  As part of the survey, building agencies were 
asked about the existence of seven organized interests in the locality and whether each 
advocated strong or weak code enforcement.  The groups are architects or engineers, 
chamber of commerce, environmental groups, general contractors association, historic 
preservation groups, homebuilders association, and neighborhood groups.  The 
percentage of groups advocating strong enforcement serves as a measure of political 
support (mean 25.68).  (One caveat is that the strength of each organization is not 
measured).  Further analysis of the politicization of the process of enforcing building 
codes is whether local elected officials become involved in specific cases about code 
compliance.  This occurred for 34 percent of jurisdictions in the sample.     
 In addition to the political environment, this study also considers the economic 
conditions of particular jurisdictions as proxies for the capacity of cities and counties 
to adopt and implement building code regulations.  While population is not a direct 
measure of professionalization, it is a good indicator.  Larger jurisdictions typically 
have a higher degree of professionalization among staff.  In addition, population also 
can reflect aspects of risk since cities with larger populations by definition have 
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greater vulnerability from a given level of non-compliance with codes.  New home 
construction also serves as a proxy for economic conditions.  On the one hand, 
increased growth creates a demand for regulatory controls, and it provides resources 
because building departments are typically funded from fees for building permits.  On 
the other hand, the resources often do not keep up with the demand straining agency 
capacity to implement regulations.   
 There are several expectations regarding the impact that the various factors 
discussed above will have on the decision of regulatees to engage in compliant 
behaviors.  They are as follows:  (1) flexible approaches will be more effective than 
coercive enforcement approaches in bringing about complaint behavior from 
regulatees, (2) agencies promoting standardization and oversight of regulatory 
inspectors will be effective in achieving regulatory compliance, (3) inspector 
discretion will be more influential than agency enforcement approaches in promoting 
compliance, (4) agency capacity is positively related to the ability of building 
departments to achieve compliance, (5) interest group advocacy for strong building 
code enforcement will enhance an agency’s ability to obtain compliance, (6) local 
elected officials involvement in building code decisions will lower industry 
compliance by sending the message to contractors that principals are not committed to 
strong code enforcement, and (7) jurisdictions with larger populations and/or new 
growth will have higher degrees of regulatory compliance than their smaller 
counterparts.    The overall expectation is that agency enforcement approaches and 
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inspector discretion, with inspector discretion being most important, are the driving 
forces behind regulatee compliance decisions.   
Findings 
 This chapter empirically considers a variety of factors that have the potential to 
shape regulatees compliance behavior.  As was previously discussed, the measure of 
compliance is the overall degree of compliance the building inspectors have obtained 
in their respective inspection areas.  
 The frequency of level and degree of compliance, based upon their specific 
responses to the mail survey, is graphically represented in Figure 5.1.  Tables 5.1 
through 5.7 represent the OLS findings regarding factors shaping compliance 
organized by the four concepts developed above.  What follows is a discussion of the 
findings related to the factors that influence industry compliance, including discretion, 
with building code regulations.     
 The results in Figure 5.1, based upon inspector evaluations of industry 
compliance, show that among the various jurisdictions, there is a relatively high 
degree of compliance.  The scores on the compliance scale (theoretical range 0 to 10), 
range from 6 to 10.  The mean score for achieved compliance was 8.09.  The modal or 
most common score was 7.50.  The standard deviation for the exercise of discretion 
was .83.  These finding suggest that regulatees do indeed comply with building codes 
(whether pressured or not) across multiple jurisdictions.   
Basing these findings on inspectors’ self-evaluations of their ability to achieve 
compliance from regulatees may seem troubling to some.  However, this should not be 
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the case.  Although subjective, many scholars have found these estimates to be 
relatively accurate (Burby et. al., 1990; Malcom et. al., 1990).  A comparison by 
Burby of subjective perceptions of North Carolina program administrators with actual 
field measurements of sediment abatement attained showed a remarkable degree of 
similarity.  For example, the administrators of the North Carolina program estimated 
that on a scale of 1 (no control) to 10 (complete control) their program should be given 
a rating of 7.  In field measurements of 128 construction sites, it was found that 74% 
of approved sediment control measures had been installed and that 68% of the projects 
had either no (27%) or a minor (47%) loss of sediment to streams or adjacent property 
(Burby 1994). 
         Table 5.2 provides a comprehensive model including all of the variables 
hypothesized to influence regulatory compliance.  These findings represent the 
statistical influence that each has, given the relative power of the other influences.  
While no single variable is able to produce overwhelming statistical influence, when 
taken as a cluster, these variables are able to predict a very respectable 33% of the 
total variance in compliance with building code regulations.   
        The one variable that appears to be driving the model of compliance is elected 
official involvement in building code decisions.  Measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 
representing frequent elected official involvement, a 1 point increase in elected official 
involvement produces a .25 point decrease in regulatory compliance (measured on a 1 
to 7 scale, with higher scores indicating higher compliance).  In other words, if elected 
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officials were involved all of the time in code decisions, a 1 point decrease in industry 
compliance would occur.   
 
FIGURE 5.1
FREQUENCY OF INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE
(SOURCE:  UNO SURVEY OF BUILDING AGENCIES)
(THEORETICAL RANGE 0 to 10)
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  Much the same is true for use of incentive enforcement tools to achieve 
compliance.  As the use of incentives increases, the level of compliance decreases.  
Specifically, for every 1 point increase in the use of incentives (measured on a 0 to 6 
scale), the level of compliance decreases .009 points.  The same can be said for 
inspector discretion.  When inspector discretion increases, compliance decreases.  In 
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short, a 1 point increase in inspector discretion produces a .07 point decrease in 
regulatory compliance.  Running the full scale of discretion to 35 would decrease 
regulatory compliance 1.96 intervals. 
         Interest group pressure and new home construction are positively related to 
regulatory compliance.  When interest group support and new home construction 
increase, compliance rises.  As the percentage of new homes increases over a ten year 
period, a 1 point change in new home construction produces a .017 increase in 
industry compliance.  Whereas, a 1 point increase in the level of pro-interest group 
support for strong code enforcement produces a .008 level change in increased 
compliance.  
These findings were slightly contrary to what was expected.  There was an expectation 
that enforcement approaches would be the driving force behind achieving compliance.  
This is clearly not the case.  While enforcement approaches have a statistically 
significant influence on regulatee behavior, most do so in the opposite direction 
hypothesized.  Political and growth factors are noteworthy positive influences upon 
compliance actions.  Demands for stronger enforcement has a positive impact (p<.01) 
on compliance actions and involvement of local elected officials in code decisions has 
a statistically significant negative effect (p<.01).  This reaffirms the supposition that 
regulatory enforcement is influenced by the dynamics of interest groups.  The impact 
is the greatest for increased demands by key interest groups for stronger enforcement 
on review of plans and on field inspection.  In addition, this confirms the hypothesis 
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that political interference by local elected officials in code decisions reduces effort that 
building departments put into field inspection, and thus compliance. 
          Lastly, both measures of growth, new housing (p<.01), and population (p<.10) 
exert influence on contractor decisions about whether to comply with building code 
regulations.  It is clear that this growth is partially fueling the capacity for jurisdictions 
to adopt and implement regulations.  This increased growth is fueling the demand for 
regulatory controls and is providing more resources through the purchase of building 
permits.  In addition, the new home construction, in many instances is more valuable, 
thus increasing the demand for more regulation since more valuable property is at risk 
of loss from non-compliance with regulations.  
       To reiterate, there is no individual variable that is the single causal factor in 
explaining regulated entities decisions to comply with the building code.  In other 
words, the slope of the regression line is not very steep.  However, when taken 
together, the variables are able to explain a respectable 33% of the variance in 
regulated entities decisions to comply.  This suggests that a large number of cases fall 
near the regression line.  To ensure that multicollinearity was not a possible cause for 
the low coefficients VIF scores were also calculated for this Comprehensive Model.   
Using the rule of thumb (Kennedy 1996) for standardized data, no variables were 
greater than 10.  Again, this gives even more support that the findings are both valid 
and reliable. 
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TABLE 5.2 
COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF 
FACTORS AFFECTING REGULATEE COMPLIANCE WITH  
BUILDING CODE REGULATIONS 
Enforcement 
Approaches 
Þ B 
Use of Flexible 
Enforcement Tools 
-.001 
(.00) 
-.03 
Use of Incentive 
Enforcement Tools 
-.009* 
(.00) 
-.21 
(table cont.) 
Use of Coercive 
Enforcement Tools 
-.001 
(.00) 
-.05 
Use of Standardized 
Fieldwork 
-.001 
(.00) 
-.27 
Inspector Discretion     -.073** 
(.02) 
-.31 
Agency Capacity -.139 
(.12) 
-.13 
Environmental/External 
Influences 
  
Interest Group Pressure   .008* 
(.00) 
.14 
Elected Officials 
Involved in Code 
Decisions 
   -.256** 
(.10) 
-.27 
Population (natural log) .00002 
(.00) 
.14 
Percentage of New 
Housing Units 
  .017* 
(.00) 
.24 
R2 .42  
Adjusted R2 .33  
F        4.72***  
N 75  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01*** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
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     Enforcement Approaches.  Table 5.3 shows the use of incentives is the only 
enforcement approach that exerts statistical influence upon regulatee decisions about 
complying and that is in the opposite direction of the relationship that is hypothesized.  
These findings are quite unique and surprising.  The use of incentives to achieve 
compliance is a relatively new phenomenon.  However, it is surprising that 
compliance actually goes down when the use of incentives increases.   The use of 
incentives is exerting a statistically inverse effect on regulatee decisions about 
compliance.  It has been hypothesized that, cooperative designs, when aggressively 
pursued, are effective in dealing with leading jurisdictions (May and Burby 1994).  
But it should be pointed out that cooperative policies, such as incentives, only work 
when those leading jurisdictions have the commitment and ability to cooperate in 
advancing policy.  Cooperative policies do little to build industry commitment to 
policy goals, while coercive policies appear to foster commitment—if only a 
“calculated commitment” aimed at foregoing sanctions for noncompliance.  Thus, 
lagging jurisdictions with less commitment to state goals fall behind, by either not 
complying, or making more modest efforts to fulfill state policy objectives.  The 
findings largely suggest that agency’s pursuing cooperative approaches to enforcement 
are likely to leave uncommitted, laggard clients untouched.  
 Agency Capacity.   Program funding and staffing varied systematically 
throughout the various jurisdictions surveyed.  We know that throughout the literature, 
there are scholars who question local capacity to administer environmental regulations 
effectively (Bosselman et. al., 1976; Jennings 1989; Rowe 1978).  In addition, it has 
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been widely documented that with more personnel available per project, local 
programs were able to apply far more deterrence, inspecting land distributing projects 
more frequently that the state and, particularly in the case of smaller local programs, 
applying more fines and stop work orders/injunctions (Burby 1994; Burby and 
Patterson 1993). 
 
   TABLE 5.3 
ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES AND THEIR 
EFFECT ON REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
 Þ B 
Use of Incentive 
Enforcement Tools 
      -.015**** 
(.00) 
-.36 
Use of Standardized 
Field Work 
.005 
(.00) 
.16 
Use of Flexible 
Enforcement Tools 
-.002 
(.00) 
-.05 
(table cont.) 
Use of Coercive 
Enforcement Tools 
.001 
(.00) 
.16 
R2 .19  
Adjusted R2 .15  
F        4.75***  
N 83  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
 
 Table 5.4 shows the primary factors, each statistically significant, are staffing 
(p<.001), and financing (p<.01).  Staffing is positively related to compliance, and 
financing is counter-intuitively negatively related to compliance.  Program staffing is 
important because it allows personnel to spend much more time per project, they can 
monitor firms and help firms understand and comply with regulatory requirements.  
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As stated above the finding regarding budgeting is counter-intuitive.  This could be for 
a number or reasons.  It may be an artifact of the data.  This survey only allows for a 
“snapshot” in time.  In other words, those inspectors’ who have been unable or 
unwilling to bring their jurisdictions into compliance may be getting the majority of 
funding in their particular geographical areas to bring recalcitrant regulatees into 
compliance.  Thus, it appears that more financing leads to less compliance.   
TABLE 5.4 
AGENCY CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE WITH BUILDING CODES 
 Þ B 
Adequacy of Staffing       .31**** 
(.08) 
.50 
Adequacy of Non-
Personnel Budget 
-.26*** 
(.10) 
-.35 
Agency Technical 
Expertise 
.20 
(.12) 
.24 
Authority for Enforcing 
Codes 
-.13 
(.15) 
-.13 
R2 .18  
Adjusted R2 .14  
F        4.29***  
N 80  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
 
 Environmental/External Influences.  Table 5.5 shows that environmental or 
external influences are highly contributory factors when discussing compliance.  
Elected officials becoming involved in building code decisions, interest group 
pressure, housing growth and population all contribute significantly to compliance 
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from the building industry.  Four of four external factors achieve statistical 
significance.   
TABLE 5.5 
ENVIRONMENTAL/EXTERNAL VARIABLES 
INFLUENCING COMPLIANCE DECISIONS 
 Þ B 
Interest Group Support      .010*** 
(.00) 
.32 
 
Local Elected Officials 
Involved in Code 
Decisions 
     -.28*** 
(.09) 
-.30 
Percentage of New 
Housing Units 
      .020*** 
(.00) 
.28 
Population (natural log)     .00003* 
(.00) 
.22 
R2 .32  
Adjusted R2 .28  
F          8.51****  
N 75  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
 
 Best Fit Model.   The model in Table 5.6 confirms that a number of factors 
potentially influence industry to comply with building code regulations.  When all of 
the statistically significant variables from the three previous models were combined 
into a larger “best-fit” model, 29% (Adjusted R2) of the variance was explained.  
Interest group pressure and elected official involvement continued to exert statistical 
influence on industry decisions about compliance with the building code.  All of the 
variables in the model continued to exert statistical influence in the same direction as 
they had previously in their “stand alone” models (e.g., Tables 5.2-5.5).   
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TABLE 5.6 
BEST FIT MODEL FOR FACTORS INFLUENCING 
INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE WITH BUILDING CODES 
 Þ B 
Elected Officials 
Involved in Code 
Decisions 
     -.262*** 
(.09) 
-.29 
Interest Group Support 
for Strong Code 
Enforcement 
   .008** 
(.00) 
.27 
Percentage of New 
Housing Units 
   .02** 
(.00) 
.27 
Adequacy of Non-
Personnel Budget 
-.20* 
(.10) 
-.26  
Population (natural log)    .00002* 
(.00) 
.18 
Use of Incentive 
Enforcement Tools 
-.005 
(.00) 
-.11 
Adequacy of Staffing .10 
(.10) 
.14 
R2 .36  
Adjusted R2 .29  
F          5.34****  
N 72  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
 
 Inspector Discretion.  Table 5.7 incorporates the inspector discretion variable into 
the best fit model as a check against the potential that it is not agency specific 
variables, but rather inspector specific variables that drive regulatees to comply with 
regulatory provisions.  Recall that discretion is the implementation variable from 
Chapter 4 and this provides a test to see if it relates as hypothesized to compliance 
(impact) as the policy literature infers.  Inspector discretion does exert strong 
statistical influence on contractor decision-making.  However, the influence that is 
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exerted is in the opposite direction that is hypothesized.   As with agency enforcement 
approaches, this style does little to build industry commitment to regulatory initiatives.  
However, it should be pointed out that the discretion that is being exercised by 
inspectors is not necessarily of the cooperative sort.  In other words, these inspectors 
may be choosing to pursue deterrent strategies rather than cooperative strategies.  The 
concept of discretion does not imply cooperation, but rather choice.  The choices that 
are being made by inspectors are obviously the wrong ones, because those inspectors 
with the greatest discretion have the lowest level of compliance.  Furthermore, these 
questions call into doubt the ability of local entities to administer regulations 
effectively.  Furthermore, as has been suggested by other scholars, these local 
individuals may e susceptible to influence by development and real estate interests 
(Logan and Molotch 1987). 
To further illustrate how the predictors included in this model affect builder decisions 
to comply with the building code, values of the dependent variable were calculated 
while manipulating the values of the independent variables.  First, all the independent 
variables were set to their values hypothesized to produce the least compliance.  The 
regression equation was then calculated and the resulting Y value equaled 7.21.  
Conversely, when the regression equation is calculated with all the dependent 
variables set to their values hypothesized to produce the most compliance, the 
estimated value of the dependent variable, is 9.27.  Overall, this illustrates a 2.06 
difference (on a 10-point scale) in compliance between those hypothesized to be least 
compliant and those hypothesized to be most compliant.    
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TABLE 5.7 
BEST FIT MODEL (INCLUDING DISCRETION) FOR 
FACTORS INFLUENCING INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE WITH BUILDING 
REGULATIONS 
 Þ B 
Elected Officials 
Involved in Code 
Decisions 
    -.24*** 
(.09) 
-.26 
Inspector Discretion   -.052** 
(.02) 
-.23 
Percentage of New 
Housing Units 
    .015** 
(.00) 
.23 
Adequacy of Non-
Personnel Budget 
-.20* 
(.10) 
-.25 
Interest Group Support 
for Strong Code 
Enforcement 
  .006* 
(.00) 
.19 
Use of Incentive 
Enforcement Tools 
-.008* 
(.00) 
-.18 
Adequacy of Staffing .10 
(.10) 
.31 
Population (natural log) .00001 
(.00) 
.12 
R2 .40  
Adjusted R2 .33  
F          5.51****  
N 72  
P<.10*, p<.05**, p<.01***, p<.001**** 
Þ=unstandardized regression coefficients 
Standard errors in parentheses 
B=standardized regression coefficients 
     
The above findings concerning the various influences that enforcement 
approaches, agency capacity, inspector discretion, and agency environmental factors 
play in affecting regulatee compliance with building code regulations have 
implications for administrative behavior and regulatory policy making.  Thus far, these 
factors have only been discussed in terms of their potential to shape inspector and 
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regulatee behavior.  The discussion that follows in Chapter 6 will provide a more in-
depth perspective of the role and the implications that all of the findings from 
Chapters 4 and 5 have in the larger perspective of regulatory policy making in the 
United States.  Further discussion of this model and the findings above, as well as the 
implications for these findings and those found in Chapter 4 regarding factors that 
shape inspector behaviors will be discussed in the next chapter.  In addition, Chapter 6 
will offer overall implications of the research findings and posit suggestions for future 
research concerning inspector discretion, regulatory compliance, and regulatory 
policies in general.    
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Chapter 6:  Conclusions and Implications 
 
 This study focused on street level bureaucrats as a way of furthering the 
understanding of actual policy implementation and impact.  Throughout the study, the 
behavior of line level workers was examined and brought to light, rectifying the 
situation that previously existed; individuals with the most potential for shaping policy 
impact were ignored.   
 Attention was given to the pressures, both internal and external, that shape 
regulatory inspector behavior.  Moreover, this study has tested a hybrid model of 
bureaucratic-decision making, incorporating tenets of the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches for influencing inspector behavior and for influencing regulatee 
compliance.  Furthermore, this study goes further than many policy studies in that it 
did not stop at the implementation “stage” of the policy process.  Instead, this study 
follows the policy from implementation to the impact stage, (compliance in this case), 
and it identifies several potential variables that exert significant influence at the 
conclusion of the policy cycle.   
 Specifically, this research considers a two-fold explanation for the reasons that the 
exercise of inspector discretion and the reasons that regulatory compliance differ 
across jurisdictions.  What is considered vital in the exercise or deterring the use of 
discretion and in achieving regulatory compliance are the internal and external 
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environments of inspectors and agencies.  Kagan (1994) termed these environments 
the “legal/task environment” and the “political environment.”  Both explanations 
consider regulatory officials and agencies as malleable entities that are responsive to 
shaping by outside forces.  This was shown to be correct.   
All of the explanatory factors—enforcement approaches, enforcement styles, the 
agency’s economic environment, inspector’s and agency’s political environments, and 
internal leadership--can exert significant pressure on regulatory behaviors and actions.  
As Kagan (1994) noted, the real intellectual exercise is to analyze the relative weight 
of each under varying circumstances.  In sum, this study contributes significantly to 
the understanding of street-level bureaucrats’ attitudes and to an understanding of how 
agencies and street-level bureaucrats interact to bring about compliance with 
regulations.  The following discussion is a summary of the study findings and their 
potential implications for regulatory policy.   
Inspector Discretion   
Fortunately, in more recent years, scholars have refocused their attention on 
the front lines of policy implementation (May and Wood 2003).  Much of this new 
research realizes the importance of street-level bureaucrats and the role of their 
decisions, motivations, and capabilities in affecting policy outcomes.  Within the 
regulatory arena, scholars have begun to zero in on the broad autonomy and discretion 
held by inspectors (May and Wood 2003; Brehm and Gates 1997; Vinzant and 
Crothers 1998). 
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Following the lead of the scholars mentioned above, this study addresses the 
exercise of inspector discretion empirically.  The findings from Chapter 4 (see Figure 
4.1) indicate that the attitudes toward inspector discretion varied greatly.  A majority 
of the inspectors surveyed were exercising moderate to high degrees of discretion.  As 
was shown in Figure 4.1, the average inspector scored 18 out of a possible 35, or a 
little more than the midpoint, for exercising discretion in various enforcement 
situations.  The question becomes one of, why do inspectors feel the need to or are 
forced to exercise discretion?  For purposes of parsimony, only the “comprehensive 
model” of inspector discretion will be discussed in detail. 
Field office discretion may develop in directions undesired by agency leaders 
for a number of reasons.  The findings gleaned from this study indicate that it is a mix 
of factors that are internal and external to the regulatory inspector’s environment that 
shaped their attitudes toward discretion.  It is clear that factors internal to the 
inspector’s environment are more important than external conditions in influencing 
their attitudes and behavior. 
The findings indicate that standardization of inspector behavior/routines or 
control strategies play an important role in limiting inspector discretion.  Kaufman 
(1960) was one of the first to posit that agencies could counteract local influences with 
a range of techniques and strategies, including procedures for controlling and “pre-
forming” decisions, detecting and discouraging deviation, and developing the will and 
capacity of field officers to conform to central guidelines.  This particular finding is of 
interest because it suggests that one of the primary forces for shaping the enforcement 
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culture of the inspector is the constant interaction of supervision and office routines 
overseen by supervisors.  If this is the case, then as Blau (1963) suggested, it is 
worthwhile for agencies to pursue or require some sense of “esprit de corps” to 
provide sufficient support for inspectors who spend much of their time in the field in 
potentially confrontational situations.   
This finding is particularly significant because it goes against the long held 
belief (Scholz 1994) that there are severe limitations in using standard routines and 
forms to control discretion.  It appears, all other things being equal, that organizational 
rules and forms can and do aid in capturing the exact behavior desired of inspectors.  
With rules and forms, subordinates who are unable or unwilling to follow agency 
procedures for exercising discretion can be forced to do so.  However, it may not be 
the case that rules and forms are necessitating inspector behavior, rather they may be  
facilitating inspector actions. 
It is clear from the results in Chapter 4 that agency leadership plays a role in 
inspector attitudes toward discretion.  However, it should be pointed out that agency 
leadership does not shape inspector discretion in the posited direction.  It was expected 
that strong agency leadership would limit the exercise of discretion.  This potentially 
should not be viewed as a negative or contradictory finding.  It is possible that strong 
leaders advocate discretion and their inspectors follow suit.  If these leaders are 
advocating discretion and if these inspectors have some sense of commitment to 
agency goals or camaraderie with fellow inspectors and supervisors, it would follow 
logically that they would avoid confrontation and follow the leader. 
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However, this potential conclusion should be viewed with caution.  The real 
possibility still remains, as Lipsky (1980) suggested, that front-line regulatory 
enforcement officials are hard to manage bureaucrats, and they employ a variety of 
stratagems to resist direction.  Regardless of their attitudes about their supervisors, 
their day-to-day enforcement routines are shaped in part by their efforts to retain some 
autonomy and to manage their own workloads.   
It is not discernible whether agency culture is immutable, or whether 
supervisors are doomed to fail in limiting inspector discretion.  It has been suggested 
that agency leaders can control front-line officials and inculcate a regulatory ethos 
(Kagan 1994).  They can change recruitment patterns, intensify supervision (as 
suggested above), invest in intensive retraining and fire or transfer the recalcitrant.  
The methods chosen and the ethos that results affect the agency’s level of activism, its 
legal decision style, the efficiency of its operations, and the effectiveness with which 
enforcement policies of top officials are translated into the desired day-to-day 
decisions.   
Agencies that advocate deterrent enforcement approaches have statistically 
significant influence on inspector’s attitudes toward discretion in the hypothesized 
direction.  In essence, agencies that pursue deterrent enforcement approaches have 
inspectors that exercise less discretion.  This is not an unexpected finding.  It should 
follow that regulatory offices that tend to be more legalistic or sanction oriented 
pursue a more coercive regulation style.  These agencies are more likely to interpret 
regulations stringently and apply them with bureaucratic literalness.  They are unlikely 
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to treat regulations as guidelines, rather they are likely to treat them as fixed 
obligations.  When an agency advocates such legalistic behavior, it would follow that 
they would emphasize the need of their inspectors to respond to detected violations by 
immediately issuing notices of violation, assessing fines, shutting down operations 
until the violations are fixed, or flatly rejecting permit applications. 
In addition, it also would follow that these legalistic agencies would stress 
standardization of inspector behavior that would institute inspector compliance.  
Furthermore, recruitment, training, and supervision would all be directed toward 
producing inspectors that were committed to agency goals rather than to an agenda 
that pursued discretion.      
The last internal factors that shape inspector attitudes are job satisfaction and 
inspector experience.  Both factors exert statistical influence in the hypothesized 
direction.  Inspectors that are satisfied are also committed to agency objectives.  This 
finding confirms earlier findings by Romzek and Hendricks (1982) that satisfied 
employees are likely to be loyal to the organization and to be conscious of the 
organization’s expectation for involvement.  Thus, it follows that they would exercise 
less discretion and follow agency directives instead.  The finding that experienced 
inspectors exercise higher levels of discretion can be attributed to two potential 
explanations.  The first would suggest that new inspectors are less sure of themselves, 
thus they are more likely to go by the book.  The second explanation involves the 
suggestion that, at least in some regulatory areas, experienced inspectors cite fewer 
violators, possibly suggesting that more experienced inspectors practice a more 
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flexible approach.  Whatever the reason, experienced inspectors are more apt to 
exercise discretion.   
Lastly, population growth is the only external factor from the Comprehensive 
Model in Chapter 4 to exert statistical influence, and it shapes inspector attitudes 
toward discretion.  This finding suggests that May and Burby (1994) are correct in 
their assumption that population growth is a good proxy for degree of staff 
professionalization, and this population growth in turn may create demand for 
regulatory controls.   
The findings from Chapter 4 clearly show that internal factors are the driving 
force in determining the attitudes of inspectors toward the exercise of discretion.  
These internal factors refer to the inside of agencies in both a structural and a process 
sense.  As noted earlier, agencies have a particular structure and a set of specific 
operative processes at any given time.  These internal factors lead inspectors to 
implement policies that have general policy consequences.   
This direct empirical analysis has provided some insight into an explanation of 
actual policy implementation.  As promised, this study goes further than much of the 
case study analysis of implementation, and it provides empirical results regarding the 
exercise of inspector discretion.  It is hoped that it has shifted some of the focus back 
to the actual policy implementers and back to the area where much actual policy 
implementation takes place--the state and local level. 
When viewed broadly, implementation means administration of the law in 
which various actors, organizations, procedures, and techniques work together to put 
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adopted policies into effect in an effort to attain policy or program goals (in this case 
building regulations).  This study has moved away from the dichotomous view of 
implementation and the question of did it take place or not.  Instead, it viewed the 
factors that potentially influence implementation behavior and their subsequent 
impact.     
Compliance    
Compliance with regulations consists of the extent to which regulatees adhere 
to the requirements of a given set of regulations (May and Wood 2003).  In this study, 
the adherence to regulations was determined by inspectors and by the degree to which 
the building industry was compliant with the building code in their given jurisdiction.  
As was noted earlier in this study, much of the literature focused on how different 
agency enforcement strategies affect compliance.  Specifically, these studies address 
the enforcement activities of agencies, their priorities for enforcement, and their 
efforts expended on enforcement (Reiss 1984; Scholz 1994; Sparrow 2000).  Of 
interest here was how agency enforcement approaches and different enforcement 
styles of inspectors (the degree of discretion exercised) affect compliance.  Again, for 
purposes of parsimony, only the “comprehensive model” regarding the findings from 
Chapter 5 will be discussed in detail. 
 When looking at industry compliance with building code regulations (Chapter 5, 
Figure 5.1), the degree and frequency of compliance is quite high, an average of 8.1 on 
a 10.0 point scale.  While it is nice to know that builders are obeying regulations and 
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inspectors are enjoying high levels of compliance, questions remain.  Specifically, 
what factors contribute to this high level of compliance?   
 To begin with, this study examined a large number of enforcement approaches, 
inspector discretion, agency capacity, and variables external to the building agency 
environment for their potential to exert statistical influence on industry decisions to 
comply.  The approaches and the capacity models performed poorly (see Chapter 5), 
but the Comprehensive Model explains 33 percent (Adjusted R2) of the variation in 
voluntary compliance by the building industry.  The large amount of unexplained 
variation is consistent with studies in the United States of compliance of individuals 
with restrictions on building codes (May and Wood 2003), individuals with 
restrictions on littering (Grasmick, Bursik, and Kinsey 1991) and tax payments 
(McGraw and Scholz 1991), with studies of compliance of firms with occupational 
and safety regulations (Gray and Scholz 1993) and water quality regulations (Burby 
and Patterson 1993), and of compliance of Danish farmers with agro-environmental 
regulations (Winter and May 2001).   
As one can see in Chapter 5, agency enforcement approaches exerted 
negligible effects on compliance decisions.  The use of incentive enforcement tools 
was the only factor to achieve statistical significance, and it was opposite of the 
hypothesized direction.  The failure to find any enforcement approach effect on 
compliance is somewhat puzzling.  However, May and Wood (2003), noted many of 
the same problems in their examination of enforcement styles in a smaller scale study 
in Washington state.  While several explanations could be potentially offered, the most 
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plausible seems to fit with the findings of May and Wood (2003).  There is an 
inconsistency of interaction between building agencies and builders.  Many of the 
survey respondents cited inconsistencies in inspector’s behavior as somewhat 
constraining in their ability to comply with code provisions.  Thus, the degree of 
consistency in inspection experiences can make a difference in compliance decisions.  
These finding would suggest that repeated interactions and consistent signals are 
necessary for fostering shared expectations about compliance.  If contacts with 
inspectors are indirect or inconsistent, it undermines the basis for shared expectations 
about compliance.  As such, it is posited that inconsistencies in inspection styles 
makes homebuilders unresponsive to stylistic differences in enforcement (May and 
Wood 2003).   
The second factor to exert strong statistical influence on compliance decisions 
is inspector discretion.  Like incentive enforcement tools, inspector discretion is 
related negatively to compliance.  In other words, as inspector discretion goes up, 
compliance with building codes decreases.  While this is one of the first forays into the 
empirical relationship between individual inspector discretion and compliance 
decisions, the finding suggests that policy congruence is important for obtaining 
industry compliance.  Apparently, there is reason for building agencies to place limits 
on discretion.  As noted above, it may not be the exercise of discretion per se that is 
leading to noncompliance, rather it may be the inconsistencies in messages from 
inspectors that confuses homebuilders and influences the noncompliant behavior. 
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    The next two variables that shape compliance behavior confirm the 
proposition that it is not only the technical and economic problems that agency’s 
encounter that shapes official action.  Rather, it is, at least partially, the charged 
political atmosphere in which regulators operate that influence compliance decisions.  
Clearly, at least in building code regulation, pro-regulatory interest groups have the 
potential to shape compliance.  These interest groups, in favor of strong code 
enforcement, apparently bring strong political pressures to bear on regulatory officials, 
with compliance being a byproduct of this intensity and predominant direction of these 
political pressures.  Furthermore, the involvement of elected officials in building code 
decisions has the expected influence that was posited in an earlier chapter.  
Involvement of elected officials has a negative relationship with compliance.  Simply 
stated, involvement of elected officials decreases compliance.  It is assumed here that 
this elected official involvement in building code decisions is a negative intrusion on 
the enforcement of building codes.  In other words, the elected official is usually 
stepping in to protest on behalf of the builder, arguing for less regulation.   
      Lastly, economic conditions exert a significant positive statistical influence on 
compliance behavior.  Growth in new home construction is clearly driving an 
increased demand for regulatory controls and providing more resources for building 
departments to conduct inspections and to prosecute violators.  In addition, it could be 
the case that with more growth there is less incentive to evade compliance, since 
builders and contractors are likely making money. 
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Implementation to Impact 
As highlighted above, implementation ostensibly occurs to reach the goals of 
some policy or statute.  To analyze public policy enforcement without some attempt to 
address whether or not the policy has been successful would leave the analysis 
incomplete.  As with most popular studies of impact, this one asked the question:  
“What did the program do?”  In this particular case, building industry regulation, the 
program achieved an 80 percent rate of compliance.  As with implementation, 
compliance is a mix of internal and external factors that shape policy impact.  In this 
case it is the opposite of implementation where internal factors were the most 
important explanans.  It appears that external factors (e.g., interest group involvement, 
politicization of the code decisions, and growth) are the driving force behind 
compliant behaviors.   
It was somewhat surprising that compliance and inspector discretion were 
negatively related.  However, and as noted earlier in Chapter 5, the discretion that is 
being exercised may not be of the cooperative sort.  Unfortunately, the data limitations 
do not allow one to determine the type of discretion that inspectors are exercising.  It 
could be that these inspectors are choosing to pursue a mix of strategies resulting in 
mixed signals, and the strategies are clearly ineffective in achieving compliance. 
      Implications and Future Research 
This study has shown that whether we are examining top-down or bottom-up 
policies, or a mixture of the two, both internal and external factors have the potential 
to shape regulatory behavior.  It is not important to agree upon a single method or to 
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agree upon a single set of variables for studying policymaking.  Rather, it is important 
that we identify the factors that shape behavior at each stage of the policy process.   
There is considerable evidence to indicate that inspectors are exercising 
discretion.  At the same time, these inspectors prove to be the least effective in 
bringing about regulatory compliance.  While not engaging in the normative debate 
regarding the positives and negatives of discretion, this does at least lend prima facie 
credibility to an argument for top-down policymaking.  It would appear that inspectors 
are not very effective in bringing about compliance with safety regulations when left 
to their own wares.  Of course, we are unaware of all of the circumstances surrounding 
each individual inspector’s agency.   
Future research should continue to explore the factors that shape inspector 
behavior.  For example, another internal factor not covered in the dissertation is the 
relative degree of legal support.  One could argue that legal support is critical to the 
use of discretion, since inspectors might be reluctant to exercise discretion on close 
calls if they did not have someone who could tell them whether it was legal or not.   
This study, while meaningful, only has provided a snapshot into regulatory 
behavior.  None of this is to say that this study should spark a normative debate 
regarding the exercise of regulatory discretion.  Rather, it is to say that to we need 
more empirical analysis of inspector behavior to understand the intricacies of inspector 
decisions.  Surveys provide valuable insight into inspector behavior, but recall is not 
always ideal.  Participant observation as well as surveys of regulated industries has the 
potential to bear much fruit.  We then can get a clearer picture of the true signals sent 
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by inspectors and also get a perception from the regulated industry, especially since 
perception is in essence reality.   
As for the study of impact, it needs more study.  As has been suggested 
throughout this research, too many studies stop at implementation, stop short of asking 
the difficult questions of how well the program performed.  While surveys and self-
assessment have proved useful in determining things such as compliance, and thus 
impact, we must continue to search for more accurate measures.  For instance, there 
are areas where we can determine actual impact (e.g., improving health, lower crime 
rates).  We must strive to improve our measures of impact.  It is often the most 
difficult, but, at the same time, it is the most rewarding aspect in research.   
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Appendix A-Data Sources and Measurement of Variables 
 
Category and Item Sourcea 
Mean (s.d.) 
Measure 
 
Dependent Variable-
Model 1 
  
 
Discretion 
 
Inspector Survey 
17.61 
(3.63) 
Alpha=.79 
 
Sum of 7 items of 
various discretionary 
behaviors engaged in by 
inspectors when 
confronted with different 
enforcement situations. 
(1=strongly disagree; 
5=strongly agree).  Scale 
converted to 0-100. 
Internal Factors   
Standardization of 
inspector behavior 
Agency Survey 
3.86 
(1.89) 
Alpha=.66 
Sum of 8 items of 
whether jurisdiction 
employed the practice or 
not in the past 12 months 
(1=yes; 0=no).   
Politicization Agency Survey 
2.10 
(.88) 
How often elected 
officials become 
involved in building 
department decisions on 
cases  
(1=never;5=often). 
 
Use of flexible 
enforcement tools 
 
Agency Survey 
48.81 
(17.10) 
Alpha=.60 
 
Sum of 6 items of 
whether jurisdiction 
allows usage flexible 
enforcement (1=yes; 
0=no). Scale converted 
to 0-100. 
Use of incentives Agency Survey 
28.76 
(19.34) 
Sum of 6 items of 
whether jurisdiction uses 
incentives to attain 
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Alpha=.50 compliance (1=yes; 
0=no).  Scale converted 
to 0-100.  
Use of fines Agency Survey 
45.93 
(31.92) 
Alpha=.64 
Sum of 3 items of 
whether jurisdiction uses 
fines to attain 
compliance (1=yes; 
0=no).  Scale converted 
to 0-100. 
Use of standard deterrent 
enforcement tools 
Agency Survey 
46.27 
(18.01) 
Alpha=.76 
Sum of 13 items of 
whether standard 
enforcement tools are 
employed (1=yes; 0=no). 
Strong agency leadership Inspector Survey 
6.98 
(3.16) 
Alpha=.88 
Sum of 12 items of the 
strength of leadership in 
a jurisdiction 
(1=yes;0=no). 
Budget adequacy Agency Survey 
3.55 
(1.09) 
A measure of the 
adequacy of the 
jurisdictions budget 
(1=poor;5=good). 
Technical expertise Agency Survey 
4.05 
(.97) 
A measure of the 
technical expertise in a 
particular jurisdiction 
(1=poor;5=good). 
Corruption Agency Survey 
.03 
(.18) 
Problems with 
corruption in any aspect 
of the code enforcement 
process (1=yes;0=no). 
Inspector experience Inspector Survey 
6.00 
(6.78) 
A measure of experience 
on the job as building 
inspector (higher #’s 
indicate more 
experience). 
 
External Factors 
  
Interest group pressure Agency Survey 
4.62 
(1.79) 
Index of interest group 
advocacy for strong code 
enforcement.  
Theoretical range of 0 to 
12. 
Population density Secondary Source 
2321 
Persons per square mile. 
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(2267) 
New Home Construction Secondary Source 
16.94 
(11.73) 
Percentage of housing 
units built between 1980-
90. 
Dependent Variable-
Model 2 
  
Compliance Inspector Survey 
8.22 
(1.06) 
A measure of the 
effectiveness of the 
building code 
enforcement program in 
each jurisdiction (1=low 
compliance;10=high 
compliance). 
Independent Variables-
Model 2 
  
 
Enforcement Approaches 
  
Use of flexible 
enforcement tools 
Agency Survey 
48.81 
(17.10) 
Alpha=.60 
Sum of 6 items of 
whether jurisdiction 
allows usage flexible 
enforcement (1=yes; 
0=no). Scale converted 
to 0-100. 
Use of incentives Agency Survey 
28.76 
(19.34) 
Alpha=.50 
Sum of 6 items of 
whether jurisdiction uses 
incentives to attain 
compliance (1=yes; 
0=no).  Scale converted 
to 0-100.  
Use of fines Agency Survey 
45.93 
(31.92) 
Alpha=.64 
Sum of 3 items of 
whether jurisdiction uses 
fines to attain 
compliance (1=yes; 
0=no).  Scale converted 
to 0-100. 
Use of standard deterrent 
enforcement tools 
Agency Survey 
46.27 
(18.01) 
Alpha=.76 
Sum of 13 items of 
whether standard 
enforcement tools are 
employed (1=yes; 0=no). 
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Supervision of field 
inspectors 
Agency Survey 
49.80 
(22.71) 
Sum 9 items regarding 
the supervision of 
inspectors in the field 
(1=yes;0=no).  Scale 
converted to 0-100. 
Discretion Inspector Survey 
17.61 
(3.63) 
Alpha=.79 
Sum of 7 items of 
various discretionary 
behaviors engaged in by 
inspectors when 
confronted with different 
enforcement situations. 
(1=strongly disagree; 
5=strongly agree).  Scale 
converted to 0-100. 
Agency Capacity Agency Survey 
3.69 
(.78) 
Alpha=.70 
Sum of 4 items 
concerning the capacity 
of the agency to enforce 
the building code 
(1=poor;5=good).  
Environmental Variables   
Interest group pressure Agency Survey 
4.62 
(1.79) 
Index of interest group 
advocacy for strong code 
enforcement.  
Theoretical range of 0 to 
12. 
Population density Secondary Source 
2321 
(2267) 
Persons per square mile. 
New Home Construction Secondary Source 
16.94 
(11.73) 
Percentage of housing 
units built between 1980-
90. 
Politicization Agency Survey 
2.10 
(.88) 
How often elected 
officials become 
involved in building 
department decisions on 
cases  
(1=never;5=often). 
aSource indicates whether data are for one of the national surveys of building 
departments or inspectors or secondary sources.  The descriptive statistics are 
computed for both the agency and inspector samples.  Non-responses vary among 
items.  For summated items, the Cronbach Alpha measure of reliability is reported. 
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Appendix B-Survey Questions 
 
Below is the exact question wording for each question used in this study.  Questions 
are grouped where appropriate (e.g., where they are combined into additive scales). 
 
Agency Capacity (Only utilized in Model 2): 
How would you rate the capacity of the Building Department to perform its mission?  
Please circle one for each of the following aspects of capacity. 
1)Adequacy of non-personnel budget 
2)Adequacy of staffing 
3)Agency technical expertise 
4)Authority for enforcing codes 
 
Agency Leadership (Only utilized in Model 1): 
Please circle all of the following leadership and managerial characteristics that apply 
to your direct supervisor. 
 1)Knowledgeable about technical aspects of the Building Code 
 2)Acknowledges a job well done 
 3)In general, supports my field enforcement decisions when complaints are received 
 4)Is knowledgeable about the practical aspects of code enforcement in the field 
 5)Coordinates well my work assignments 
 6)Accessible 
 7)Good motivator 
 8)Good problem solver 
 9)Gives instructions that are easy to understand 
10)Active in seeking to improve my work conditions (e.g., salary, resources) 
11)Active in looking for ways to improve my technical capacity (e.g., training 
opportunities, technical materials, speakers) 
12)Sets clear goals 
 
Budget Adequacy (Only utilized in Model 1):   
How would you rate the capacity of the Building Department to perform its mission?  
Please circle one for each of the following aspects of capacity.  Adequacy of non-
personnel budget? 
 
Compliance (Only utilized in Model 2): 
Overall, how effective is the building code enforcement program? Please rate 
effectiveness in attaining compliance with building code requirements on a scale of 1 
to 10, with 1 indicating low compliance with code requirements and 10 being 
complete (100%) compliance with code requirements. 
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Corruption (Only utilized in Model 1): 
During the past ten years, has the Building Department experienced any problems with 
corruption in any aspect of the code enforcement process (e.g., attempted bribery of an 
inspector, inspector blackmail of contractor)? 
 
 
Discretion (Utilized in Model 1 and 2): 
1)For a new contractors whose compliance record is unknown, Building Code 
provisions should be applied flexibly at first and then, depending on compliance 
response, modify enforcement accordingly. 
2)The provisions of the Building Code are too complex and numerous; as a result, I 
enforce mainly those I am most familiar with. 
3)The provisions of the Building Code are too complex and numerous, as a result, I 
enforce mainly those that I consider are most effective in protecting life and safety. 
4)In practical terms, it is not possible to prevent all code violations and, thus, 
enforcement largely involves tolerating a certain level of noncompliance 
5)Discretion is necessary because the enforcement situations that I face in the field are 
more complex than those covered by the Building Code. 
6)I apply Building Code provisions more strictly with “bad apples” (i.e., chronic 
offenders) 
7)I apply Building Code provisions more leniently with “good apples” (i.e., those who 
comply regularly. 
 
Enforcement approaches: 
Use of fines (Utilized in Model 1 and 2) 
1)Fine levied for working without permit in the last 12 months 
2)Fine levied for not following approved plan in the past 12 months 
3)Fine levied for not following code provisions in the past 12 months 
 
Use of flexible enforcement tools (Utilized in Model 1 and 2) 
1)Inspectors can vary enforcement procedures with assessment of cause of violation 
2)Inspectors authorized to bluff in order to obtain compliance 
3)Inspectors allowed to be lenient when life safety not threatened 
4)Inspectors can badger contractors who are chronic violators 
5)Inspectors can relax standards based on extenuating circumstances 
6)Inspectors can spend extra time on site to develop good relations with regulated 
 
Use of incentives (Utilized in Model 1 and 2) 
1)Less frequent inspections 
2)Bend over backward to be cordial 
3)Modify standards for firms with good records with approval of higher authority 
4)Other incentives 
5)Prior record of violator taken into account in decision to prosecute 
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6)Attitude of violator taken into account in decision to prosecute 
 
Use of informal communication (Utilized in Model 1 and 2) 
1)Verbal notice of violation 
2)Verbal notice of corrective action 
3)Mediation of disputes over interpretation of code 
 
Use of standard deterrent enforcement tools (Utilized in Model 1 and 2) 
 1)Written notice of violation 
 2)Written notice of corrective action 
 3)Stop work order 
 4)Revocation of building permit 
 5)Revocation of certificate of occupancy 
 6)Temporary restraining order 
 7)Preliminary injunction 
 8)Permanent injunction 
 9)Infraction field citation/fine 
10)Misdemeanor prosecution/fine 
11)Fine levied for working without permit in past 12 months 
12)Fine levied for not following approved plan in past 12 months 
13)Fine levied for not following code provisions in past 12 months 
 
Supervision of field inspectors  (Only utilized in Model 2) 
1)Inspection checklists and forms 
2)Department policy or procedure manual 
3)Periodic review of inspectors work 
4)Inspectors required to consult supervisor/building official on hard calls 
5)Rotate field inspectors’ territories 
6)Intensive training of inspectors in department policy and procedures 
7)Annual performance evaluation of inspectors 
8)Follow-up field inspections of inspectors’ work 
9)Productivity measures used to evaluate inspectors’ work 
 
Inspector Experience (Only utilized in Model 1): 
In what year did you begin working for this Building Department? 
 
Interest Group Pressure (Only utilized in Model 1 and 2): 
Index of interest group advocacy for strong code enforcement.  Dichotomous measure 
of the interest group activity of six interest groups for strong code enforcement. 
 
Job Satisfaction (Only Utilized in Model 1): 
What is your overall level of satisfaction with your job as Building Inspector? 
 
New Home Construction (Utilized in Model 1 and 2): 
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Percentage of housing units built between 1980 and 1990 
 
Politicization (Utilized in Model 1 and 2): 
How often do elected officials become involved in Building Department decisions on 
specific building code cases? 
 
Population Density (Utilized in Model 1 and 2): 
Population density (persons per square mile) 
 
 
Technical Expertise (Only Utilized in Model 1): 
How would you rate the capacity of the Building Department to perform its mission?  
Please circle one for each of the following aspects of capacity.  Agency technical 
expertise? 
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